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gjm comments on Potential vs already existent people and aggregation - Less Wrong Discussion

2 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 04 December 2014 01:38PM

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Comment author: gjm 05 December 2014 11:52:20AM 1 point [-]

For the reason I, and owencb, and Unknowns, and peter_hurford, have all given, there is a very big difference between the scenarios that at least on the face of it has nothing to do with aggregation.

Differences related specifically to aggregation may also be relevant, but I don't think this can be the right example to illustrate this because what it mostly illustrates is that for most of us a whole human life has a lot more moral weight than one millisecond of torture (assuming, again, that "one millisecond of torture" actually denotes anything meaningful).

You might want to consider either finding a different example, or explaining why it's a good example after all in some more convincing way than just saying "But it is".

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 08 December 2014 09:05:50AM 0 points [-]

See my edit: the purpose of this post is simply to show that there is a difference between certain reasoning for already existing and potential people. I don't argue that aggregation is the only difference, nor (in this post) that total utilitarianism for potential people is wrong.