This is only because zero is special (in that it gives rise to an infinity). And the whole point of the Kelly Rule is that once you hit zero you lose forever, so following it will never result in you getting to zero dollars. Once we're dealing only with positive numbers, whatever maximizes the expected value in dollars, maximizes the expected value in log dollars as well.
Average of 1 and 100 is 50.5. Average of log(1) and log(100) is log(10). If you're offered a choice of a 50:50 chance of 1 vs 10 and a sure amount between 10 and 50.5, then you're better off with the bet for maximizing expected value, but you're better off with the sure thing for maximizing the expected log value.
A lottery ticket sometimes has positive expected value, (a $1 ticket might be expected to pay out $1.30). How many tickets should you buy?
Probably none. Informally, all but the richest players can expect to go broke before they win, despite the positive expected value of a ticket.
In more precise terms: In order to maximize the long-term growth rate of your money (or log money), you'll want to put a very small fraction of your bankroll into lotteries tickets, which will imply an "amount to invest" that is less than the cost of a single ticket, (excluding billionaires). If you put too great a proportion of your resources into a risky but positive expected value asset, the long-term growth rate of your resources can become negative. For an intuitive example, imagine Bill Gates dumping 99% percent of his wealth into a series of positive expected-value bets with single-lottery-ticket-like odds.
This article has some graphs and details on the lottery. This pdf on the Kelly criterion has some examples and general dicussion of this type of problem.
Can we think about Pascal mugging the same way?
The applicability might depend on whether we're trading resource-generating-resources for non-resource-generating assets. So if we're offered something like cash, the lottery ticket model (with payout inversely varying with estimated odds) is a decent fit. But what if we're offered utility in some direct and non-interest-bearing form?
Another limit: For a sufficiency unlikely but positive-expected-value gamble, you can expect the heat death of the universe before actually realizing any of the expected value.