MazeHatter comments on What are the thoughts of Less Wrong on property dualism? - Less Wrong Discussion
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So you're saying, that in reality external to the mind, there is such a thing as a thumb?
It depends. Is there such a thing as sound?
In the external reality, there are quarks. My body is a particular set of (continually replaceable) quarks that more-or-less obeys my mind; besides, my mind has privileged access to the sensory inputs of this body, so it's justified to consider it as distinct from the rest of reality. A category like "thumb" is a shortcut entry that is very useful to refer to a subset of quarks that stay in a very specific, more-or-less constant configuration.
So, does my thumb exist? Yes, in the sense that a bird flock exists because some of them fly together.
Let's say we're talking about the source code of reality.
You and I seem to agree we could start somewhere like "var quarks = [...]".
My position is that there is no "flockofbirds" or "var polymathswannabe_thumb = "
Those a purely made by the mind.
Likewise, in reality, there is no "brain" or "brainstem" or "frontallobe", there is just "var quarks = []".
The brain is a product of a mind.
You have it backwards. Even though our image of the brain and all of the concepts associated with the semantic shortcut "brain" are mental fabrications, the mind itself is the product of a terribly complex arrangement of quarks which happen to exist within the physical boundaries that we conventionally call a brain.
That the mind exists within physical boundaries, (ie, quantitative material, temporal, or spatial relationships) has not been demonstrated.
The entire field of psychopharmacology rests on the assumption that the mind has a physical basis. Substances that alter the functioning of the brain will make your mind work differently. Also, brain lesions may severely limit what your mind can do. This very strongly suggests that the mind is not only experienced "through" the brain, but that it originates in the brain. Equally important evidence is the fact that nothing else affects the functioning of the mind; if you want to alter it, you need to tinker with the brain.
You make a pretty good point.
The mind originates from the brain, experimentation strongly suggests.
In my mind, overcoming that bias is the definition of rationalism (ie, empirical truths are not fundamental truths).
If you're not going to trust empirical evidence, what on Earth are you going to trust? How is dismissing empirical evidence the definition of rationalism?
Critical rationalism.
"Rationalists have such a high confidence in reason that proof and physical evidence are unnecessary to ascertain truth – in other words, "there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience".[4] Because of this belief, empiricism is one of rationalism's greatest rivals."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationalism
If you believe that you get truth from the senses, you are missing the part where the mind processes that sense experience in a conceptual framework.
The biases in the conceptual framework need to be analyzed through rational processes, as they are already apparent in the observations we make, and thus observation alone will not reveal them.
I'm sure it's been explained to you several times that the meaning of "rationalism" prevalent on LW is not the technical philosophical meaning that makes it opposite to "empiricism".
There is nothing wrong with using "rationalist" in this way rather than with the technical philosophical meaning; e.g., the second definition in the OED (the first being a theological one) is "The doctrine or belief that reason should be the only guiding principle in life, obviating the need for reliance on, or adherence to, any form of religious belief" which isn't quite the LW usage but is a clear ancestor of it.
I have the impression from your comments about "rationalism" here that either (1) you think that no one uses the term "rationalist" with any meaning other than the technical philosophical one, or (2) you think that no one should and are interpreting every use of the word that way even though you know that's not how it's really being used, presumably to make a point. If #1, you are simply wrong. If #2, you are being pointlessly rude.
Do you expect us to disagree? If so, why?
I'm not advocating naive realism, and I don't think anyone at LW does. The map-territory metaphor, much beloved at LW, is a comprehensive rejection of naive realism. However, I see "the part where the mind processes that sense experience" as being exactly the part where you "get truth."
Do you mean critical rationalism in the sense of Popper? I find this strange given your other comments since Popper's notion of critical rationalism does allow one to use empirical data to falsify hypotheses.
(This is aside from the fact that critical rationalism is an utterly unsatisfactory approach to epistemology.)