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Manfred comments on Selfish preferences and self-modification - Less Wrong Discussion

4 Post author: Manfred 14 January 2015 08:42AM

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Comment author: ike 15 January 2015 04:06:50PM 0 points [-]

10% or more of all decisions

Then we have the problem of deciding what counts as a decision. Even very minor changes will invalidate a broad definition like "body movements", as most body movements will be different after the 2 diverge.

My prefered diverging point is as soon as the cloning happens. I'm open to accepting that as long as they are identical, they can cooperate, but that can be justified by pure TDT without invoking "caring for the other". But any diverging stops this; that's my Schelling point.

Comment author: Manfred 16 January 2015 07:18:41PM *  0 points [-]

any diverging stops this

The trouble is, of course, that if you both predictably (say, with 98% probability) switch to defecting after one sees 'A' and the other sees 'B', you could just as easily (following some flavor of TDT) predictably cooperate.

This issue is basically the oversimplification within TDT where it treats algorithms as atomic causes of actions, rather than as a lossy abstraction from complex physical states. This is a very difficult AI problem that I'm pretending is solved for the purposes of my posts.