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Mark_Friedenbach comments on Open thread, Jan. 26 - Feb. 1, 2015 - Less Wrong Discussion
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I still don't understand the apparently substantial difference between Frequentist and Bayesian reasoning. The subject was brought up again in a class I just attended—and I was still left with a distinct "... those... those aren't different things" feeling.
I am beginning to come to the conclusion that the whole "debate" is a case of Red vs. Blue nonsense. So far, whenever one tries to elaborate on a difference, it is done via some hypothetical anecdote, and said anecdote rarely amounts to anything outside of "Different people sometimes treat uncertainty differently in different situations, depending on the situation." (Usually by having one's preferred side make a very reasonable conclusion, and the other side make some absurd leap of psuedo-logic).
Furthermore, these two things hardly ever seem to have anything to do with the fundamental definition of probability, and have everything to do with the assumed simplicity of a given system.
I AM ANGRY
They are the same thing. Gertrude Stein had it right: probability is probability is probability. It doesn't matter whether your interpretation is Bayesian or frequentist. The distinction between the two is simply how one chooses to apply probability: as a property of the world (frequentist) or as a description of our mental world-models (Bayesian). In either case the rules of probability are the same.
This phrasing suggests that Bayesians can't accept quantum mechanics except via hidden variables. This is not the case.
Taboo the word Bayesian.
I was talking about the Bayesian interpretation of probability. An interpretation, not a category of person. Quantum mechanics without hidden variables uses the frequentist interpretation of probability.
Sometimes in life we use probability in ways that are frequentist. Other times we use probability in ways that are Bayesian. This should not be alarming.
Fair enough. The idea of calling QM 'frequentist' really stretches the reason for using that term under anything but an explicit collapse interpretation. Maybe it would be more of a third way -