EDIT: The neighboring comment here, raises the same point (using the same type of example!). I wouldn't have posted this duplicate comment if I had caught this in time.

I'm also confused about the debate.

Isn't the "thing that hasn't happened yet" always an anticipated experience? (Even if we use a linguistic shorthand like "the dice roll is 6 with probability .5".)

Suppose Alice tells Bob she has rolled the dice, but in reality she waits until after Bob has already done his calculations and secretly rolls the dice right before Bob walks in the room. Could Bob have any valid complaint about this?

Once you translate into anticipated experiences of some observer in some situation, it seems like the difference between the two camps is about the general leniency with which we grant that the observer can make additional assumptions about their situation. But I don't see how you can opt out of assuming something: Any framing of the P("sun will rise tomorrow") problem has to implicitly specify a model, even if it's the infinite-coin-flip model.