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emr comments on Open thread, Feb. 9 - Feb. 15, 2015 - Less Wrong Discussion

6 Post author: MrMind 09 February 2015 09:12AM

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Comment author: ciphergoth 10 February 2015 01:32:20AM *  5 points [-]

I found this exercise surprising and useful. Supposing we accept the standard model that our utility is logarithmic in money. Let's suppose we're paid $100,000 a year, and somewhat arbitrarily use that as the baseline for our utility calculations. We go out for a meal with 10 people where each spends $20 on food. At the end of the meal, we can either all put in $20 or we can randomize it and have one person pay $200. All other things being equal, how much should we be prepared to pay to avoid randomization?

Take a guess at the rough order of magnitude. Then look at this short Python program until you're happy that it's calculating the amount that you were trying to estimate, and then run it to see how accurate your estimate was.

from math import exp, log
w = 100000
b = 20
k = 10
print w - b - exp(log(w-k*b)/k + log(w)*(1-1.0/k))

Incidentally I discovered this while working out the (trivial) formula for an approximation to this following conversations with Paul Christiano and Benja Fallenstein.

EDITED TO ADD: If you liked this, check out Expectorant by Bethany Soule of Beeminder fame.

Comment author: emr 10 February 2015 02:40:41AM 7 points [-]

Conversly, if you'd pay much more than this, you are absurdly risk averse: Here's a pdf of a classic paper by Rabin: Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem

Abstract:

Within the expected-utility framework, the only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility function for wealth is concave: A person has lower marginal utility for additional wealth when she is wealthy than when she is poor. This paper provides a theorem showing that expected-utility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for apprecia- ble risk aversion over modest stakes: Within expected-utility theory, for any concave utility function, even very little risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes. Illustrative calibrations are provided

Comment author: Jiro 10 February 2015 06:53:26PM 0 points [-]

This seems to make an unwarranted assumption about exactly how the marginal utility diminishes.

Comment author: emr 11 February 2015 01:37:23AM 1 point [-]

The paper, or my comment? I interpreted the paper as an attack on (explanatory) models of risk aversion that are based on this (quite general) type of utility curve, with the conclusion that observed behavior can't be motivated by such a curve.

Comment author: Douglas_Knight 10 February 2015 07:39:06PM *  1 point [-]

This is a great example of If It’s Worth Doing, It’s Worth Doing With Made-Up Statistics. If the assumption is your True Rejection, it's worth playing around with alternate models to see if you can get a different answer. The simple truth is that humans are dynamically inconsistent.