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Nanashi comments on A rational approach to the issue of permanent death-prevention - Less Wrong Discussion

-4 Post author: Nanashi 11 February 2015 12:22PM

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Comment author: Nanashi 11 February 2015 02:57:44PM *  1 point [-]

Is there a consensus on the whole brain backup identity issue?

No, and thank you for pointing out the potential for confusion in this post. I have edited some key wording: "results in the continuation of the perception of consciousness." has now been changed to "results in a perception of consciousness functionally indistinguishable to an outside observer," which much more closely reflects my intent.

So in other words, if John Doe went into a locked room, created a copy of himself, incinerated the original version, disposed of all the ashes, and then walked out of the room, the copy would be indistinguishable from the original John Doe from your perspective as an outside observer.

How John Doe himself perceives that interaction is an extremely difficult question to answer (or even to really formulate scientifically).

Comment author: [deleted] 12 February 2015 03:56:15PM 0 points [-]

How John Doe himself perceives that interaction is an extremely difficult question to answer (or even to really formulate scientifically).

But that does not make it any less relevant a question.

Comment author: Lumifer 11 February 2015 05:03:29PM 0 points [-]

from your perspective as an outside observer

"Outside observers" can be very different. You probably need to define that observer a bit better.