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tzachquiel comments on [LINK] The Wrong Objections to the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics - Less Wrong Discussion
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I like to think of it as an extension of the conjunction fallacy; the probability of A and B being true can't be higher than the probability of either A or B; adding new conditions can only make the probability stay the same or go down. So the probability of a theory once it has an extra postulate, must be equal to or lower than the probability of the same theory with fewer postulates. Of course, that assumes the independence of the postulates.
The probability of the postulates all being true goes down as you add postulates. The probability of the theory being correct given the postulates may go up.
This assumes the postulates are interdependent such that the theory may be true with all postulates, but false with all postulates save one. In this case, the theories are the same except for the collapse postulate, which may or may not have any real-world consequences, depending on whether you believe decoherence accounts for the appearance of collapse all by itself.
Not only it assumes independence, it also assumes that the two competing theories have exactly the same postulates except for a single extra one. That is typically not how things work in real life.
Er, no it doesn't. Where are you getting this?
From here: