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TheAncientGeek comments on [LINK] The Wrong Objections to the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics - Less Wrong Discussion

17 [deleted] 19 February 2015 06:06PM

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Comment author: TheAncientGeek 24 February 2015 10:31:47AM 0 points [-]

You have missed the point. For any kind of "woo" , there are people who claims it works..

Comment author: dxu 25 February 2015 12:50:56AM 0 points [-]

For any kind of "woo" , there are people who claims it works..

I... really don't see how this has anything to do with the discussion, unless you're calling science woo.

...Are you calling science woo?

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 25 February 2015 09:59:18AM *  1 point [-]

I am saying that to demarcate woo from non-woo using the criterion of "working" you need a criterion of working that isn'ta subjective gut feeling. You need to solve the problem of formalising the empirical justification of empiricism.

Comment author: dxu 25 February 2015 04:40:45PM 0 points [-]

All right. How about this: something "works" if it is independently replicable and reliably results in statistically significant deviations from the null result.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 26 February 2015 10:07:54AM *  0 points [-]

Reliable results of what? Is there anything that reliably indicates realism? If someone says that your reliable resultsare just accurate predictions of subjective experience, how do you counter them? And does your method tell you what you should be doing , or just what experiences to passively expect?