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n4r9 comments on [LINK] The Wrong Objections to the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics - Less Wrong Discussion
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To clarify: do you believe that there is something ontological in the system which is assigning probabilities of measurement outcomes in some way, when you make a measurement of the obervable O?
Probabilities aren't ontological; they're epistemological. I agree with everything that Eliezer writes about that, probabilities are in the map, etc.
But remove that word; there is something ontological that assigns measurement outcomes when I make a measurement. Or to keep it simpler: when I make a measurement, the measurement outcome is ontological.
A belated thank you for your replies. I feel like I'm starting to get the hang of what it means to take seriously the idea that probabilities are epistemological. It's difficult, moving between papers espousing differing interpretations, because their very language tends to presuppose some ontological commitment or other.