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shminux comments on Can we decrease the risk of worse-than-death outcomes following brain preservation? - Less Wrong Discussion

8 Post author: Synaptic 21 February 2015 10:58PM

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Comment author: shminux 21 February 2015 11:14:47PM 3 points [-]

Easy, if you are worried about worse-than-death life after revival, don't get preserved. It's not like there are too few people in the world and no way to create more. I'll take my chances, if I can. I don't expect it to be a problem to self-terminate later, should I want to. I don't put any stock in the scary scenarios where an evil Omega tortures a gazillion of my revived clones for eternity.

Comment author: Synaptic 21 February 2015 11:25:25PM 5 points [-]

Well, this is certainly a reasonable response. But if there is a mechanism to decrease the probability that a worse-than-death outcome would occur so that people who had expressed these concerns are more likely to want to do brain preservation and more people could be a part of the future, that seems like an easy win. I don't think people are particularly fungible.

Comment author: jlp 22 February 2015 06:00:05PM 2 points [-]

I don't put any stock in the scary scenarios where an evil Omega tortures a gazillion of my revived clones for eternity.

Could you elaborate on this? I'd be curious to hear your reasoning.

Does "don't put any stock" mean P(x) = 0? 0.01? 1e-10?

Comment author: shminux 22 February 2015 07:00:29PM *  4 points [-]

It means the noise level, down there with Pascal's Wager/Mugger and fairy tales coming true. Assigning a number to it would mean giving in to Pascal's Mugging.