Epictetus comments on Can we decrease the risk of worse-than-death outcomes following brain preservation? - Less Wrong Discussion
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Comments (31)
This runs into a thorny ethical problem. It's like assisted suicide, except you're neither terminally ill, nor in a vegetative state, nor in extreme pain. Since you don't have anything more than a vague idea of the future, you're unable to provide the kind of informed consent necessary for this sort of thing. A friendly future is more likely to revive you and provide you with the appropriate psychiatric resources.
I think that is an unnecessarily limited idea of informed consent. Shouldn't knowing a probability distribution be enough for the consent to be informed?
You don't know the probability distribution.