One of the major problems I have with classical "greatest good for the greatest number" utilitarianism, the kind that most people think of when they hear the word, is that people act as if these are still rules handed to them from on high. When given the trolley problem, for example, people think you should save the five people rather than the one for "shut up and calculate" reasons, and that they are just supposed to count all humans exactly the same because those are "the rules".
I do not believe that assigning agents moral weight as if you are getting these weights from some source outside yourself is a good idea. The only way to get moral weights is from your personal preferences. Do you find that you assign more moral weight to friends and family than to complete strangers? That's perfectly fine. If someone else says they assign all humans equal weight, well, that's their decision. But when people start telling you that your weights are assigned wrong, then that's a sign that they still think morality comes from some outside source.
Morality is (or, at least, should be) just the calculus of maximizing personal utility. That we consider strangers to have moral weight is just a happy accident of social psychology and evolution.
I do not believe that assigning agents moral weight as if you are getting these weights from some source outside yourself is a good idea.
Suppose I get my weights from outside of me, and you get your weights from outside of you. Then it's possible that we could coordinate and get them from the same source, and then agree and cooperate.
Suppose I get my weights from inside me, and you get yours from inside you; then we might not be able to coordinate, instead wrestling each other over the ability to flip the switch.
Some moral questions I’ve seen discussed here:
Yet I spend time and money on my children and parents, that may be “better” spent elsewhere under many moral systems. And if I cared as much about my parents and children as I do about random strangers, many people would see me as somewhat of a monster.
In other words, “commonsense moral judgements” finds it normal to care differently about different groups; in roughly decreasing order:
- immediate family
- friends, pets, distant family
- neighbors, acquaintances, coworkers
- fellow citizens
- foreigners
- sometimes, animals
- (possibly, plants...)
… and sometimes, we’re even perceived as having a *duty* to care more about one group than another (if someone saved three strangers instead of two of his children, how would he be seen?).In consequentialist / utilitarian discussions, a regular discussion is “who counts as agents worthy of moral concern” (humans? sentient beings? intelligent beings? those who feel pain? how about unborn beings?), which covers the later part of the spectrum. However I have seen little discussion of the earlier part of the spectrum (friends and family vs. strangers), and it seems to be the one on which our intuitions agree the most reliably - which is why I think it deserves more of our attention (and having clear ideas about it might help about the rest).
Let’s consider two rough categories of decisions:
Impartial utilitarianism and consequentialism (like the question at the head of this post) make sense for impersonal decisions (including when an individual is acting in a role that require impartiality - a ruler, a hiring manager, a judge), but clash with our usual intuitions for personal decisions. Is this because under those moral systems we should apply the same impartial standards for our personal decisions, or because those systems are only meant for discussing impersonal decisions, and personal decisions require additional standards ?
I don’t really know, and because of that, I don’t know whether or not I count as a consequentialist (not that I mind much apart from confusion during the yearly survey; not knowing my values would be a problem, but not knowing which label I should stick on them? eh, who cares).
I also have similar ambivalence about Effective Altruism:
Scott’s “give ten percent” seems like a good compromise on the first point.
So what do you think? How does "caring for your friend’s and family" fit in a consequentialist/utilitarian framework ?
Other places this has been discussed:
Other related points: