But that presupposes that I value cooperation with you. I don't think it's possible to get moral weights from an outside source even in principle; you have to decide that the outside source in question is worth it, which implies you are weighing it against your actual, internal values.
I think you're mixing up levels, here. You have your internal values, by which you decide that you like being alive and doing your thing, and I have my internal values, by which I decide that I like being alive and doing my thing. Then there's the local king, who decides that if we don't play by his rules, his servants will imprison or kill us. You and I both look at our values and decide that it's better to play by the king's rules than not play by the king's rules.
If one of those rules is "enforce my rules," now when the two of us meet we both expect the other to be playing by the king's rules and willing to punish us for not playing by the king's rules. This is way better than not having any expectations about the other person.
Moral talk is basically "what are the rules that we are both playing by? What should they be?". It would be bad if I pulled the lever to save five people, thinking that this would make me a hero, and then I get shamed or arrested for causing the death of the one person. The reasons to play by the rules at all are personal: appreciating following the rules in an internal way, appreciating other people's appreciation of you, and fearing other people's reprisal if you violate the rules badly enough.
If the king was a dictator and forced everyone to torture innocent people, it would still be against my morals to torture people, regardless of whether I had to do it or not. I can't decide to adopt the king's moral weights, no matter how much it may assuage my guilt. This is what I mean when I say it is not possible to get moral weights from an outside source. I may be playing by the king's rules, but only because I value my life above all else, and it's drowning out the rest of my utility function.
On a related note, is this an example of a intrapersonal utility monster? All my goals are being thrown under the bus except for one, which I value most highly.
Some moral questions I’ve seen discussed here:
Yet I spend time and money on my children and parents, that may be “better” spent elsewhere under many moral systems. And if I cared as much about my parents and children as I do about random strangers, many people would see me as somewhat of a monster.
In other words, “commonsense moral judgements” finds it normal to care differently about different groups; in roughly decreasing order:
- immediate family
- friends, pets, distant family
- neighbors, acquaintances, coworkers
- fellow citizens
- foreigners
- sometimes, animals
- (possibly, plants...)
… and sometimes, we’re even perceived as having a *duty* to care more about one group than another (if someone saved three strangers instead of two of his children, how would he be seen?).In consequentialist / utilitarian discussions, a regular discussion is “who counts as agents worthy of moral concern” (humans? sentient beings? intelligent beings? those who feel pain? how about unborn beings?), which covers the later part of the spectrum. However I have seen little discussion of the earlier part of the spectrum (friends and family vs. strangers), and it seems to be the one on which our intuitions agree the most reliably - which is why I think it deserves more of our attention (and having clear ideas about it might help about the rest).
Let’s consider two rough categories of decisions:
Impartial utilitarianism and consequentialism (like the question at the head of this post) make sense for impersonal decisions (including when an individual is acting in a role that require impartiality - a ruler, a hiring manager, a judge), but clash with our usual intuitions for personal decisions. Is this because under those moral systems we should apply the same impartial standards for our personal decisions, or because those systems are only meant for discussing impersonal decisions, and personal decisions require additional standards ?
I don’t really know, and because of that, I don’t know whether or not I count as a consequentialist (not that I mind much apart from confusion during the yearly survey; not knowing my values would be a problem, but not knowing which label I should stick on them? eh, who cares).
I also have similar ambivalence about Effective Altruism:
Scott’s “give ten percent” seems like a good compromise on the first point.
So what do you think? How does "caring for your friend’s and family" fit in a consequentialist/utilitarian framework ?
Other places this has been discussed:
Other related points: