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Alon comments on Anti-Pascaline agent - Less Wrong Discussion

4 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 12 March 2015 02:17PM

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Comment author: Alon 08 May 2016 12:32:55PM *  0 points [-]

It seems this type of AI might cheat and set ε=0 using the following method:

  1. create an "insurance company" subagent (see below for what it is and why creating it has a utility that is >ε).
  2. give the insurance company a few utilons (paper clips) to hold as hostages.
  3. set a rule that all future subagents will be able to communicate the insurance company.
  4. the insurance company will "buy" all the reward that has a probability < ε from subagents at roughly its fair price (its utility)
  5. all subagents won't ignore events that happen with probability < ε because their very existence is has a probability of 1 to increase their utility (via the insurance company).

alternatively for any ε you set, it will be profitable for the AI to create a new version of itself with the same utility function and ε'=ε/2 than give the new AI all the resources it has and commit suicide.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 09 May 2016 11:30:05AM 0 points [-]

alternatively for any ε you set, it will be profitable for the AI to create a new version of itself with the same utility function and ε'=ε/2 than give the new AI all the resources it has and commit suicide.

This doesn't seem true. A ε/2 AI will take risks, looking for higher utility, that the ε AI wouldn't.