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Gram_Stone comments on Rationality Reading Group: Fake Beliefs (p43-77) - Less Wrong Discussion
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As a rationality exercise, maybe you could play a special version of the game where someone takes the gamble against you over and over again until you lose, so that you can really feel on a gut level that there is no Fortune Fairy protecting you from bad luck. (And if you're really patient, maybe by playing a few times a day for a long time, then you could keep track of your win/loss ratio and watch as it tends toward 1:1.) You might also be selectively remembering times that you were fortunate because they're more available and they confirm your Fortune Fairy hypothesis.
On the other hand, if you keep winning...
You know, I think I might actually describe all of my "risk-taking" behavior as a giant rationality exercise, trying to test my so-called luck.
As for your special version idea, it wouldn't be the same game. It's not like I act like I'll win every luck-related game.
My family would confirm that none of them have ever won a gamble against me in dozens of games. If I lost, it would be pretty memorable, so I don't think it's confirmation bias as much as a case of things with low probability actually occurring sometimes. And despite this game not being my favorite, I always wanted to play it, "just for the gamble" because my win streak was so bizarre to me.
Anyway, this is silly. It's not like I actually admit I think I have a > 50-50 chance of winning. My insistence on gambling every time was probably just out of having nothing to lose in most cases, and an even longer and more fun win streak to gain.
So now, I'd no longer say my actions don't correspond to my professed disbelief. I'd say my actions are attempts to prove my professed disbelief correct.