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ESRogs comments on Open Thread, Jun. 8 - Jun. 14, 2015 - Less Wrong Discussion

4 Post author: Gondolinian 08 June 2015 12:04AM

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Comment author: TezlaKoil 08 June 2015 09:43:34PM *  16 points [-]

Is such a long answer suitable in OT? If not, where should I move it?

tl;dr Naive ultrafinitism is based on real observations, but its proposals are a bit absurd. Modern ultrafinitism has close ties with computation. Paradoxically, taking ultrafinitism seriously has led to non-trivial developments in classical (usual) mathematics. Finally: ultrafinitism would probably be able to interpret all of classical mathematics in some way, but the details would be rather messy.

1 Naive ultrafinitism

1.1. There are many different ways of representing (writing down) mathematical objects.

The naive ultrafinitist chooses a representation, calls it explicit, and says that a number is "truly" written down only when its explicit representation is known. The prototypical choice of explicit representation is the tallying system, where 6 is written as ||||||. This choice is not arbitrary either: the foundations of mathematics (e. g. Peano arithmetic) use these tally marks by necessity.

However, the integers are a special^1 case, and in the general case, the naive ultrafinitist insistance on fixing a representation starts looking a bit absurd. Take Linear Algebra: should you choose an explicit basis of R3 that you use indiscriminately for every problem; or should you use a basis (sometimes an arbitary one) that is most appropriate for the problem at hand?

1.2. Not all representations are equally good for all purposes.

For example, enumerating the prime factors of 2*3*5 is way easier than doing the same for ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, even though both represent the same number.

1.3. Converting between representations is difficult, and in some cases outright impossible.

Lenstra earned $14,527 by converting the number known as RSA-100 from "positional" to "list of prime factors" representation.

Converting 3\^\^\^3 from up-arrow representation to the binary positional representation is not possible for obvious reasons.

As usual, up-arrow notation is overkill. Just writing the decimal number 100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 would take more tally-marks than the number of atoms in the observable universe. Nonetheless, we can deduce a lot of things about this number: it is an even number, and its larger than RSA-100. Nonetheless, I can manually convert it to "list of prime factors" representation: 2\^80 * 5\^80.

2 Constructivism

The constructivists were the first to insist that algorithmic matters be taken seriously. Constructivism separates concepts that are not computably equivalent. Proofs with algorithmic content are distinguished from proofs without such content, and algorithmically inequivalent objects are separated.

For example, there is no algorithm for converting Dedekind cuts to equivalence classes of rational Cauchy sequences. Therefore, the concept of real number falls apart: constructively speaking, the set of Cauchy-real numbers is very different from the set of Dedekind-real numbers.

This is a tendency in non-classical mathematics: concepts that we think are the same (and are equivalent classically) fall apart into many subtly different concepts.

Constructivism separates concepts that are not computably equivalent. Computability is a qualitative notion, and even most constructivists stop here (or even backtrack, to regain some classicality, as in the foundational program known as Homotopy Type Theory).

3. Modern ultra/finitism

The same way constructivism distinguished qualitatively different but classically equivalent objects, one could starts distinguishing things that are constructively equivalent, but quantitatively different.

One path leads to the explicit approach to representation-awareness. For example, LNST^4 explicitly distinguishes between the set of binary natural numbers B and the set of tally natural numbers N. Since these sets have quantitatively different properties, it is not possible to define a bijection between B and N inside LNST.

Another path leads to ultrafinitism.

The most important thinker in modern ultra/finitism was probably Edward Nelson. He observed that the "set of effectively representable numbers" is not downward-closed: even though we have a very short notation for 3\^\^\^3, there are lots of numbers between 0 and 3^^^3 that have no such short representation. In fact, by elementary considerations, the overwhelming majority of them cannot ever have a short representation.

What's more, if our system of notation allows for expressing big enough numbers, then the "set of effectively representable numbers" is not even inductive because of the Berry paradox. In a sense, the growth of 'bad enough' functions can only be expressed in terms of themselves. Nelson's hope was to prove the inconsistency of arithmetic itself using a similar trick. His attempt was unsuccessful: Terry Tao pointed out why Nelson's approach could not work.

However, Nelson found a way to relate unexpressibly huge numbers to non-standard models of arithmetic^(2).

This correspondence turned out to be very powerful, leading to many paradoxical developments: including finitistic^3 extension of Set Theory; a radically elementary treatment of Probability Theory and a new ways of formalising the Infinitesimal Calculus.

4. Answering your question

What kind of mathematics would we still be able do (cryptography, analysis, linear algebra …)?

All of it; modulo translating the classical results to the subtler, ultra/finitistic language. This holds even for the silliest versions of ultrafinitism. Imagine a naive ultrafinitist mathematician, who declares that the largest number is m. She can't state the proposition R(n,2^(m)), but she can still state its translation R(log_2 n,m), which is just as good.

Translating is very difficult even for the qualitative case, as seen in this introductory video about constructive mathematics. Some theorems hold for Dedekind-reals, others for Cauchy-reals, et c. Similarly, in LNST, some theorems hold only for "binary naturals", others only for "tally naturals". It would be even harder for true ultrafinitism: the set of representable numbers is not downward-closed.

This was a very high-level overview. Feel free to ask for more details (or clarification).


^1 The integers are absolute. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what this means.

^2 coincidentally, the latter notion prompted my very first contribution to LW

^3 in this so-called Internal Set Theory, all the usual mathematical constructions are still possible, but every set of standard numbers is finite.

^4 Light Naive Set Theory. Based on Linear Logic. Consistent with unrestricted comprehension.

Comment author: ESRogs 09 June 2015 07:06:34AM *  0 points [-]

What is LNST?

Edit: Nevermind, saw the footnote.