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Elo comments on Open Thread, Jun. 29 - Jul. 5, 2015 - Less Wrong Discussion
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Suppose an agent has to choose between two main options. He can choose neither or either, but not both. His preference for each of the options is unknown, probably even by the agent himself (behaviour during the experiment signals indecision). Picture the experiment akin to a subject getting to make a pick between two useable objects such as toys, cars, gadgets etc. He is allowed to play/experiment with both of them during the experiment. Throughout the experiment, he exhibits a moderate preference for one of them, and spends more time using it.
Then, the experimenter removes the other choice from the setup, and subsequently interviews the subject on his preferences for both options, while asking him to disregard the fact that his preferences do not matter anymore in the outcome. So, he's only left with one, presumably the favourite so far, but has to express opinions on both, after the fact.
Based on your model of human choice, how likely is he to irrationally exhibit a higher preference for the removed option and a decreased preference for the remaining one, on the grounds that the choice was no longer "his" to make?
How does this compare to the somewhat opposite "sour grapes" irrational tendency?
Has such an experiment been made, to confirm or disprove the existence of this bias?
(P.S. I'm aware there's a design flaw in that the first preference is observed and the other is self-reported. If that's a no-no, let's introduce a step where the subject is interviewed with both options still available, and measure increases or decreases relative to that.)
This experiment has been done with various paintings.
it goes something like this: * experimenter offers ~30 paintings to subject * Subject rates paintings 1-10 * experimenter concludes by saying; we would like to give you a painting to keep, if you want it. (painting happens to be a 3-4 on the scale of their evaluations) * experimenter leaves and comes back days or weeks later * experimenter asks subject how they like painting (1-10) or to evaluate the whole set of paintings again. * subject now rates the painting they got to keep as higher than previously. * experiment was also done on people with altzheimers and the same effect was found even when the patient had no memory of the previous experiment or the experimenter.
Sorry I don't have a name or a link to the papers, but it was at least a few years ago. Something about cognitive dissonance I believe; about how you wouldn't accept the painting unless you liked it therefore you convince yourself that you like it more than you did.
I also remember reading the experiment with people with Alzheimer's. I remember it like this:
1) they showed them six paintings to order by how much they like them: #1 to #6;
2) then they told them they can take one of the paintings #3 or #4 (of course they took #3);
3) later (when the patients forgot everything), they were asked to order the six painting again... the painting #3 usually moved to a somewhat better position, and #4 to somewhat worse position.
So the lesson seems to be that when we actively accept (or reject) something, our brain adjusts to perceive that thing as better (or worse). This is not the same as rationalitazion, because it is not a bullshit you tell yourself when asked; this is a genuine change in preferences.