I get the impression that you're not well informed about EA and the diverse stances EAs have, and that you're singling out an idiosyncratic interpretation and giving it an unfair treatment.
Effective altruism is inefficient and socially suboptima.
The first link you cite talks about public good provision within the current economy. How do you conclude from this that e.g. the effective altruists focused on AI safety are being inefficient? And even if you're talking about e.g. donations to GiveWell's recommended charities, how does the first link establish that it's inefficient? Sick people in Africa usually tend to not be included in calculations about economical common goods, but EAs care about more than just their country's economy.
Effective Altruism isn’t utilitarian. It’s explicitly welfarist and given the complexity of individual value, probably undermines overall utility, including your own.
FYI, you're using highly idiosyncratic terminology here. Outside of LW, "utilitarianism" is the name for a family of consequentialist views that also include solely welfare-focused varieties like negative hedonistic utilitarianism or classical hedonistic utilitarianism.
In addition, you repeat the mantra that it's an objective fact that "human values are complex". That's misleading, what's complex is human moral intuitions. When you define your goal in life, no one forces you to incorporate every single intuition that you have. You may instead choose to regard some of your intuitions as more important than others, and thereby end up with a utility function of low complexity. Your terminal values are not discovered somewhere within you (how would that process work, exactly?), they are chosen. As EY would say, "the buck has to stop somewhere".
EA is prioritarian.
This claim is wrong, only about 5% of the EAs I know are prioritiarians (I have met close to 100 EAs personally). And the link you cite doesn't support that EAs are prioritarians either, it just argues that you get more QALYs from donating to AMF than from doing other things.
Thanks for your comment.
How do you conclude from this that e.g. the effective altruists focused on AI safety are being inefficient?
Yes, as you stated I was working with the visible sample of EA's who aren't focused on existential risk. I feel the term in relation to existential risk is redundant since effective thinking about existential risk on Lesswrong.
And even if you're talking about e.g. donations to GiveWell's recommended charities, how does the first link establish that it's inefficient?
The crowding out effect occurs not just as the individu...
In this thread, I would like to invite people to summarize their attitude to Effective Altruism and to summarise their justification for their attitude while identifying the framework or perspective their using.
Initially I prepared an article for a discussion post (that got rather long) and I realised it was from a starkly utilitarian value system with capitalistic economic assumptions. I'm interested in exploring the possibility that I'm unjustly mindkilling EA.
I've posted my write-up as a comment to this thread so it doesn't get more air time than anyone else's summarise and they can be benefit equally from the contrasting views.
I encourage anyone who participates to write up their summary and identify their perspective BEFORE they read the others, so that the contrast can be most plain.