Uh, I was under the impression that most consequentialists are moral universalists. They don't believe that morality can be simplified into absolute statements like "lying is always wrong", but do still believe in conditional moral universals such as "in this specific circumstance, lying is wrong for all subjects in the same circumstance".

This is fundamentally different from moral relativism that argues that morality depends on the subject, or moral nihilism that says that there are no moral truths at all. Moral universalism still believes there are moral truths, but that they depend on the conditions of reality (in this case, that the consequences are good).

Even then, most Utilitarian consequentialists believe in one absolute inherent moral truth, which is that "happiness is intrinsically good", or that "the utility function, should be maximized."

Admittedly some consequentialists try to deny that they believe this and argue against moral realism, but that's mostly a matter of metaethical details.