If you're saying 'LessWrongers think there's a serious risk they'll be acausally blackmailed by a rogue AI', then that seems to be false. That even seems to be false in Eliezer's case,

Is it?

Assume that:
a) There will be a future AI so powerful to torture people, even posthumously (I think this is quite speculative, but let's assume it for the sake of the argument).
b) This AI will be have a value system based on some form of utilitarian ethics.
c) This AI will use an "acausal" decision theory (one that one-boxes in Newcomb's problem).

Under these premises it seems to me that Roko's argument is fundamentally correct.

As far as I can tell, belief in these premises was not only common in LessWrong at that time, but it was essentially the officially endorsed position of Eliezer Yudkowsky and SIAI. Therefore, we can deduce that EY should have believed that Roko's argument was correct.

But EY claims that he didn't believe that Roko's argument was correct. So the question is: is EY lying?

His behavior was certainly consistent with him believing Roko's argument. If he wanted to prevent the diffusion of that argument, then even lying about its correctness seems consistent.

So, is he lying? If he is not lying, then why didn't he believe Roko's argument? As far as I know, he never provided a refutation.