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Halfwitz comments on I need a protocol for dangerous or disconcerting ideas. - Less Wrong Discussion
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality#Max_Tegmark.27s_work
That doesn't seem very air tight. There is still a world where a "you" survives or avoids all forms of degradation. It doesn't matter if it's non-binary. There are worlds were you never crossed the street without looking and very, very, very, very improbable worlds where you heal progressively. It's probably not pleasant but it is immortality.
How would I contact a version of me in another branch? It isn't me at all anymore. You can receive and experience permanent brain damage, so why would a death experience be any different? And what about sleep? If this was true it seems like you wouldn't be able to let go of any of your mental faculties at all.
There will be a "thread" of subjective experience that identifies with the state of you now no matter what insult or degeneration you experience. I assumed you were pro-teleporter. If you're not why are you even worried about dust theory?
What is 'me?' I'm not an ontologically basic thing. As long as it is a process, I don't see why I wouldn't just die.
The branches wherein you die are effectively discounted, because there is no future you who will remember your current self. The same applies to lesser degree to branches where you suffer brain/memory damage, to varying partial degree.
The problem with the whole QM suicide/immortality is that it assumes that we shouldn't care about measure, and we shouldn't care at all about universes that lack ourselves as future observers. Both of these notions are probably wrong from the perspective of normal human utility functions.
Why? What is so irreducible about my memories?
Well think through an example: imagine the future world where 'your' brain contains someone else's memories and personality tomorrow instead of your own. Compare that to the future world where your body contains someone else's skin pattern on the right arm ( a similar amount of physical matter/information replacement).
In the first world 'you' (the bio software mind I am currently speaking to) ceases to exist, whereas in the second world 'you' remains.
I don't understand. I'm asking about irreducibility.
I don't understand then - what do you mean by irreducibility of memories?
I'm with Yvain on measure, I just can't bring myself to care.
Relative measure matters, but its equivalent to probability and thus adds up to normality.