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RichardKennaway comments on Open Thread, Jul. 13 - Jul. 19, 2015 - Less Wrong Discussion

5 Post author: MrMind 13 July 2015 06:55AM

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Comment author: [deleted] 14 July 2015 12:48:10PM 2 points [-]

Can you recommend an article about what is the difference between the simulation of a person vs. "really" reviving a person? Primarily from the angle of: why should I or anyone would consider someone in the future making a plausible simulation of us is good for "us" ? I am really confused about the identity of a person i.e. when is a simulation is really "me" in the sense of me having a self-interest about that situation. I am heavily influenced by Buddhist ideas saying such an identity does not exist, is illusionary. I currently think the closest thing to this is memories, if I exist at all, I exist as something that remembers what happened to this illusion-me. I see this as a difficult philosophical problem and don't know how to relate to it.

Comment author: RichardKennaway 14 July 2015 04:17:26PM 2 points [-]

Can you recommend an article about what is the difference between the simulation of a person vs. "really" reviving a person? ... I see this as a difficult philosophical problem and don't know how to relate to it.

Same here. My own attitude is that we do not currently have software for which the question of it being any more conscious than a rock arises, nor any route to making such software. Therefore I am not going to worry about it. While it may be interesting for philosophers, I relate to the problem by ignoring it, or engaging in it no further than as an idle recreation.