= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
Lumifer comments on Crazy Ideas Thread - October 2015 - Less Wrong Discussion
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (114)
I think that jacob_cannell's implication was this but without "you'll die at the end." You die at the end physically but the point of the simulation is to obtain your mental state at the end of your life, so you can transfer that to heaven.
(I don't believe there will ever be any possibility of rerunning a particular human being's life in any manner that would be even close to his actual life.)
Why "at the end of ... life"? If you're simulating someone, what's special about a particular point when the physical body died?
The point at which someone dies is the point at which their mind no longer causally effects the simulation. Naturally they can be copied out before then, but historical accuracy requires at least one version to remain in the sim until death.
And why should the AI care about historical accuracy?
I guess the real question is the difference between minds simulated on the basis of historical data (="previously existing") and minds simulated de novo, just plausible human minds invented out of thin air. Why should the AI favour previously existing minds?
BTW, affects the simulation, not effects.
We are assuming an FAI, The FAI cares about historical accuracy to the degree that people care about resurrecting accurate versions of dead family/friends/ancestors, where accuracy is subjective and relative to memories and beliefs.
More generally, the resources available will determine some finite number of minds that can be created. Some individuals will choose to create lots of 'children' (generalized to include de novo minds), some will choose to resurrect lots of ancestors, others will choose to use resources only to expand/clone their existing mind, many will probably choose some mix.
Oh, boy, that's such a can of worms. Let's resurrect grandpa, except we'll delete some features of him that we don't like and try to forget about. Or let's resurrect my girlfriend from college but let's make her a nympho.
I would venture a guess that people rarely care about accurate versions of dead people, they would prefer improved ones.
All in all, this just looks like a silicon version of ancestor worship. If you venerate your ancestors or, say, if you are a Mormon you convert them the Mormonism, isn't that acausal trade in practice? They begat you, you do things for their souls...
Other friends/family/descendants - as well as society in general - is unlikely to want these changes.
People alive today will want accurate versions of themselves to exist in the future. Society/future FAI will also consider this.
Avoid naive pattern matching.
Really? Is there anyone who would prefer an incontinent grandpa raving about today's degeneracy which the Good Lord will burn out? Or a grandpa who lived to a really advanced stage of Alzheimer's?
Oh, I do, I do :-) I pick insightful pattern matching instead.
Because that's the time when you would want to be resurrected.
If I'm being simulated, I have already been "resurrected". But what is the point of resurrection? You yourself say "so you can transfer ... to heaven" and given that, what is the reason for running the simulation at all instead of not collecting $200 and going directly to heaven?
If the simulation isn't run all the way through, the simulators couldn't be sure they were resurrecting you instead of someone else (since the mind they were simulating might suddenly have started to do other things that you wouldn't have done, if they had continued to the simulation.) For example, suppose they base the simulation in part on your Less Wrong comments. If they manage to produce a mind that produces the first half of your comments, then they say, "good enough, let's move that to heaven," it might be that the mind they put in heaven would have gone on to produce a second set of comments totally diverse from the real ones that you made. So it ended up being someone else in heaven, not you.
That goes to the issue of who is "you".
I, a year ago, was a slightly different person than I am now. Both past-me and current-me are me. You are essentially saying that me-who-died is the version that should go to heaven and all the previous versions should not. Why?
We can also reverse the issue -- in a simulation, I don't have to die. If I am hit by a bus, insert a one-minute delay somewhere and the simulated-I will continue to live. Should that longer-lived version go to heaven, then?
Historical consistency - an intervention like that quickly leads to a fictional world that is ranked low in the ress utility function (because people from that fictional world don't go on to create the actual future resurrection).
So is this whole "res utility function" based on obligations arising out of acausal trades?
In part but there are also can be regular causal trades between simulators within each world. For example a future simulation physically located in say china will necessarily be separate from located in canada. These simulators can trade in the more regular sense.