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DanArmak comments on Philosophical schools are approaches not positions - Less Wrong Discussion
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Can you give a concrete example of using the monist vs dualist approach? An approach is presumably a way to solve some other problem, or to choose some behavior or belief. What are things that monists and dualists would do or believe (i.e. predict or expect) differently?
Linguists are mainly descriptive. Philosophers appear to be in large measure prescriptive. Arguing (prescriptively) for an approach should imply arguing that it's better than other approaches, in which case the judgement criteria and the goal should be made explicit. Can philosophy be described in such terms? Or would you say that philosophy is indeed better understood as being descriptive?
Certainly some philosophy is concerned with being descriptive - it tries to describe what people actually believe or alieve, and to draw logical conclusions from that or to make it consistent. But I'm pretty sure the philosophical debates of monism vs dualism, or free will vs. lack of it vs. various ways of explaining it in other terms, aren't simply debates about what "normal" people (i.e. not philosophers) believe or alieve about these subjects.
("tauntological": using circular arguments in a debate to taunt your over-logical opponent into a frenzy)
That does seem tautological - and independently so of the words "free will". Every person who (honestly) claims that X believes in X, but you have to ask them what they're using the word X to mean. That's kind of obvious.
What interesting things are there to say about what philosophers actually use "free will" to mean, and what they believe about those things? Your post doesn't seem to say anything about this.
I've been thinking I need to find a better example, but I don't have one now. I'll have some more examples of use in future posts, right now I'm just trying to produce a coherent description of the core meta-philosophical concepts that I'll need.
I've edited my post to clarify that part of it - it only becomes linguistic after a certain point:
"We begin by using philosophy to establish the facts. In some cases, only one description may match the situation, but in other cases, it may be ambiguous. If this occurs, we could allow a debate to occur over which is the better description..." I've added this text in italics.
My point is simply that no more precise statement that captures the full-breadth can be made. We can linguistically analyse "free will" to explain what the most common interpretations of the term are, but we'll always miss something. This vaguely reminds me of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, we can have a definition that captures the full-breath (but tells us almost nothing specific), or we can have something super-formally specified that completely fails at breadth.
There are two completely different problems we can try to solve.
The first problem is, "what do people mean by the words 'free will', and what do they believe about the concept they reference, and why do they use these words or concepts to begin with"? This is a problem for linguists, anthropologists, historians, psychologists, neurologists, maybe even evolutionary biologists. And it's a completely empirical one, even if hard to solve.
Crucially, it doesn't seem to be a problem in need of philosophy, unless philosophers are somehow selected or self-selected so that their own self-reports are more valuable than those of other people, while still being representative of people in general. (Nobody really wants to know the answer to "'what do philosophers use the words 'free will' to mean, which is completely unrelated to what everyone else uses those words to mean?")
I hope everyone would agree that whatever people mean by words, and believe about their referent, doesn't necessarily prove any objective truths about the referent.
The second problem we can try to solve is whether there actually is free will and how it should be best described. Of course, if different people mean different things by "free will", then this is a set of different and unrelated problems. Since we're presumably motivated by actual problem(s) and not by the mere occurrence of these words - even if the problems are driven by intuition and not by empirical evidence - we should be able to taboo the words "free will" and state the problems directly. Solving the second kind of problem should not require first solving the first one.
Have philosophers done this? Did they turn out to be working on the same questions? Do they have any good arguments for any of their positions beyond intuitions (which should be used to solve the first kind of question, not the second one)?
ETA: for example, a dualist might say: "spirits can affect matter, creating material effects that don't have detectable material causes. This action is called the free will of the spirit, particularly a human spirit." This might be a strawman which no-one actually believes, but it would be a concrete statement about free will, trying to solve the second kind of problem.
Of course, everything I've said here about free will is applicable to any philosophical debate where not everyone agrees about the meaning of the words being debated.
In your first case, you gave a classic example of experimental philosophy. I completely disagree with your characterization of the subject as non-philosophical . Proto-philosophical , I'd suggest. Concept mapping is an excellent starting point for recommendations on how to improve our understanding of problems that involve substantial conceptual confusion.
Google x-phi (yes it has a nickname ) and you'll see plenty of work on free will, as well as plenty of metaphilosophical debate on its usefulness.
Up voted - great comment regardless of the above disagreement.
Yes, naturalistic Libertarians have put forward empirically testable theories of free will, in which the term "free will "is tabooable.
I agree with the SEP when it says that:
If the non-deterministic behavior is entirely random (i.e. unpredictable), it clearly doesn't describe our free will. But if it obeys various rules, then how is it different from ordinary dualism, with these rules describing a non-material domain with 'uncaused causes'?
This approach seems so much based on trying to prove intuitions about free will that it persists long after any unbiased person would say, fine, we proposed an empiric theory and it was empirically proven false, case closed, there is no free will.
That is exactly what naturalistic libertarians dispute. Here "clearly" means not "can be seen to be true at a glance", but "seems true when not thought about too much". The argument is on a par with "saying that of course things can travel faster than light, I don't see what is stopping them"? The SEP quote does not preclude non-obvious claims.
Wrong way round. Naturalistic libertarians are proposing empirically testable claims, the opponents who seek to reject their claims using the One-Line Argument are the ones using intuition. (Of course,naturalistic libertarians also have opponents who can make a detailed and informed critique).
When I say that:
Here is what I mean.
Our free will is clearly partially predictable. We are somewhat rational and highly consistent actors, not random noise generators. I can predict what I'll do in various situations, and even what other people will do, much better than by chance.
Now of course you might say the predictable part comes from ordinary physics, and the unpredictable element is free will. But if free will is equated to pure random noise, I really don't think it's doing any useful work anymore except for saying "the universe isn't deterministic". It doesn't match the intuition we started out trying to explain.
What do nat-libs claim? Do they think free will is 'entirely random' or 'entirely unpredictable' (which may be slightly different), and what do they use those words to mean, exactly?
If free will means the ability to do things that aren't entirely determined by previous and external circumstances, then partial randomness explain free will. If free will means having an inner homuncular self that is the ultimate source of deciion making, then it doesn't. Note the difference between the two definitions..one describes a kind of outcome or manifestation of free will, the other defines a possible underlying mechanism for it..in fact, a supernaturalistic mechanism. Natualistic liberatarians aren't beholden to defend a non-naturalistic theory of free will, so they are not obliged to defend the second definition of free will, only the first.
No, they think it is partly random. See http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/two-stage_models.html
All two-stage models seem to have this in common: first there is a random, nondeterministic, unpredictable, or 'free' stage, which generates possibilities. Then there is a rational, at least partially predictable 'will' stage which chooses an action from the possibilities presented.
This might well be a good neurological or psychological model of decision making. (Although I'd expect the actual implementation to have multiple sources of suggestions, and multiple modules and layers of filtering and choosing.) I just don't see what it has to do with "free will".
All discussion of "free will" starts with the fact that we feel like we are freely choosing from possible alternatives. It doesn't matter here how the alternatives were generated: when presented with a multiple choice test, where the alternatives are fixed, we still we're exercising free will in answering it. Why does it help to specify that the generation of possibilities is random?
(Some of) the philosophers quoted in your link say the benefit is being able to choose otherwise in exactly identical repeating circumstances (e.g. simulation reruns) because the generation of alternatives is not deterministic. I don't see why that would be a good thing: it just means that some of the time you won't generate an alternative that you would have chosen in those runs where you did generate - in other words, you lose out because you don't or can't generate all the alternatives all the time.
If the generation process is thought to be completely random, and the selection process completely deterministic, I don't see how this matches an intuition of "free will". (Granted, arguing about intuitions is usually silly in the first place and assumes too much about the typical mind.)
So what are the empirical claims these models make? At least, that we should find in the brain a separation between random generation of ideas (e.g. amplification of chance or chaotic events) and rational selection of outcomes. That would be a great day for the neuro sciences. I just don't think it would convince anyone about anything regarding "free will" or the lack thereof. (After all, philosophers kept believing in free will even when physicists were quite sure the universe was deterministic...)
it might be the case that the issue "starts with" the feeling of being able to make choices, but it starts in the sense that what the debate is about is the most direct interpretation of this feeling that we actually can make free choices. The debate is about what causes, or underlies, or best explains the feeling. For centuries there has been a debate about the conflict between free will and determinism (or, earlier, between free will and divine omniscience or foreordination). That hasn't been centuries of people stupidly failing to notice that the feeling of freedom is trivially compatible with any amount of determinism so long as the feeling is taken to be an illusion.
How do you know? For what value of "free will"? It is now acknowledged that there are different concepts of free will. The compatibilist concept is about being able to make choices without external duress, so by that definition your answers are freely chosen so long as no one is pointing a gun at your head, or anything like that. But is is obvious that most people are free most of the time under that definition, so the historical debate cannot have been about that concept.
The incompatibilist concept of free will contains further conditions, in particular the condition that when we make a free choice we could have done otherwise. That is a straight contradicition to strict determinism, because under determinism, there is no way things could have been otherwise.
Because random possibilities are free from determination by past events, thus allowing that affairs in fact could be otherwise, that multiple real possibilities are actually available.
The point is to give an explanation of what the feeling of free choice seems, directly, to be, not to give an account of why it is valuable or optimal.
The generation process cant be completely random, the range of ideas you can generate has to be constrained by your past history and experience...a caveman can't come up with relativity.
A lot of philosophers kept believing in compatibilist free will, which is..well..compatible with determinsim. Very few kept believing in incompatibilist free will. In fact, the revival of incompatibilist libertarianism has come partly from physics, since the "news" that the universe isn't necessarily deterministic has filtered through very slowly to philosophy...Tony Dore, the Information Philosopher actually has a physics background.