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So8res comments on The trouble with Bayes (draft) - Less Wrong Discussion

10 Post author: snarles 19 October 2015 08:50PM

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Comment author: So8res 26 October 2015 07:23:49PM 1 point [-]

I mostly agree here, though I'm probably less perturbed by the six year time gap. It seems to me like most of the effort in this space has been going towards figuring out how to handle logical uncertainty and logical counterfactuals (with some reason to believe that answers will bear on the question of how to generate priors), with comparatively little work going into things like naturalized induction that attack the problem of priors more directly.

Can you say any more about alternatives you've been considering? I can easily imagine a case where we look back and say "actually the entire problem was about generating a prior-like-thingy" but I have a harder time visualizing different tacts altogether (that don't eventually have some step that reads "then treat observations like Bayesian evidence").

Comment author: Wei_Dai 27 October 2015 02:59:24AM 1 point [-]

Can you say any more about alternatives you've been considering?

Not much to say, unfortunately. I tried looking at some frequentist ideas for inspiration, but didn't find anything that seemed to have much bearing on the kind of philosophical problems we're trying to solve here.