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AABoyles comments on Omega's Idiot Brother, Epsilon - Less Wrong Discussion

3 Post author: OrphanWilde 25 November 2015 07:57PM

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Comment author: AABoyles 25 November 2015 09:12:07PM *  4 points [-]

To take the obvious approach, let's calculate Expected Values for both strategies. To start, let's try two-boxing:

(80/8000 * 1000) + (7920/8000 * 1,001,000) = $991,000

Not bad. OK, how about one-boxing?

(3996/4000 * 1,000,000) + (4/4000 * 0) = $999,000

So one-boxing is the rational strategy (assuming you're seeking to maximize the amount of money you get).

However, this game has two interesting properties which, together, would make me consider one-boxing based on exogenous circumstances. The first is that the difference between the two strategies is very small: only $8000. If I have $990-odd thousand dollars, I'm not going to be hung up the last $8000. In other words, money has a diminishing marginal utility. As a corollary to this, two-boxing guarantees that the player receives at least $1000, where one-boxing could result in the player receiving nothing. Again, because money has a diminishing marginal utility, getting the first $1000 may be worth the risk of not winning the million. If, for example, I needed a sum of money less than $1000 to keep myself alive (with certainty), I would two-box in a heartbeat.

All that said, I would (almost always, certainly) one-box.

Comment author: OrphanWilde 25 November 2015 09:28:16PM 0 points [-]

The interesting properties actually all exist in the original Newcomb's Problem, which if you're not familiar with it, has two important differences: First, Omega leaves the boxes, so they're both there. Second, Omega always, or nearly always in some variations, predicts what you'll do. (So the expected value is $1,000 versus $1,000,000).

The addition of these two properties result in some number of people insisting they'd two-box, and in at least one philosopher's answer, if for no other reason than to take a principled stand for human autonomy and free will. (Which, if this weren't all talk, would be rather an expensive principle that one has no choice but to stand up for...)