Help with understanding some non-standard-LW philosophy viewpoints

iarwain1

For a while now I've been trying hard to understand philosophical viewpoints that defer from mine. Somewhere along the line I've picked up or developed a lot of the LW-typical viewpoints (not sure if this was because of LW, or if I developed them earlier and that's what later attracted me to LW), but I know there are a lot of smart people out there who disagree with those viewpoints. I've tried to read articles and books on this, but they either don't address what I'm looking for somehow, or they're so technical that I have a hard time following them. I've also talked at some length with a philosophy professor, but our conversations often seem to end with me still being confused and the professor being confused about what it is I might be confused about.

I'm thinking maybe it'll help to get some input from people who do intuitively agree with my viewpoints, hence this post. So, can someone please tell me what the central arguments or motivations are for promoting the following:

Epistemology:

Trusting philosophical intuitions and/or the way people use words to the point of making strong metaphysical claims about the world, despite the findings of cognitive science / evolutionary psychology / experimental philosophy / etc. that there doesn't seem to be any good reason to trust those intuitions / ways of talking
Not looking at the world in a probabilistic way
Using personal preference or personal intuitions as priors instead of some objective measure along the lines of Solomonoff Induction

Ontology / philosophy of mind:

Moral realism
Mathematical Platonism
Libertarian free will (I'm looking for arguments other than those from religion)
The view that there actually exist abstract "tables" and "chairs" and not just particles arranged into those forms
The existence of non-physical minds (I'm looking for arguments other than the argument from the Hard Problem of Consciousness)

I suspect I'm having trouble with the ontology issues because of my trouble understanding the epistemology issues. Specifically, I keep getting the impression that most (all?) of the arguments for the ontology issues boil down to trusting philosophical intuitions and/or the way people use words. Something along the following lines:

I intuitively feel that there really are objective morals (or: objective mathematics, actual free will, tables and chairs, minds).

Therefore, there really are objective morals (etc.).

Or the equivalent using the way people talk about things.

But this just seems totally ludicrous to me. If we trust cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, etc., and if those fields give us perfectly plausible reasons for why we might intuitively feel this way / talk this way, even if it didn't reflect the truth, then what could possibly be your motivation for sticking to your intuitions anyway and using them to support some grand metaphysical theory?

The only thing I can think of is that people who support using intuitions like this say, "well, you're also ultimately basing yourself on intuitions for things like logic, existence of mind-independent objects, Occamian priors, and all the other viewpoints that you view as intuitively plausible, so I can jolly well use whatever intuitions I feel like too." But although I can hear such words and why they sound reasonable in a sense, they still seem totally crazy to me, although I'm not 100% sure why.

Any help would be appreciated.

Epistemology:

Trusting philosophical intuitions and/or the way people use words to the point of making strong metaphysical claims about the world, despite the findings of cognitive science / evolutionary psychology / experimental philosophy / etc. that there doesn't seem to be any good reason to trust those intuitions / ways of talking
Not looking at the world in a probabilistic way
Using personal preference or personal intuitions as priors instead of some objective measure along the lines of Solomonoff Induction

Ontology / philosophy of mind:

Moral realism
Mathematical Platonism
Libertarian free will (I'm looking for arguments other than those from religion)
The view that there actually exist abstract "tables" and "chairs" and not just particles arranged into those forms
The existence of non-physical minds (I'm looking for arguments other than the argument from the Hard Problem of Consciousness)

I intuitively feel that there really are objective morals (or: objective mathematics, actual free will, tables and chairs, minds).

Therefore, there really are objective morals (etc.).

Or the equivalent using the way people talk about things.

Any help would be appreciated.

Penrose's arguments for Platonism, with commentary:

"Our individual minds are notoriously imprecise, unreliable and inconsistent in their judgements" "Road to Reality", Roger Penrose, p12-13

So when we do maths we are not using our minds, but something else? Or maybe we are just using our minds in disciplined way -- after all, the discipline of maths has to be painfully learnt.

"Does this not point to something outside ourselves with a reality that lies beyond what each individual can achieve?"

What is achieved by individuals is achieved by individuals. How can some transcendent realm speak through the mouth of an individual?

"Nevertheless, one might take the alternative view that the mathematical world has no independent existence, and consists of certain ideas which have been distilled from our various minds, and which have found to be totally trustworthy, and are 'agreed by all', for example, or 'agreed by those in their right mind's, or 'agreed by those who have a PhD in mathematics' (not much use in Plato's day), and who have a right to venture an authoratiative opinion".

Which mathematical world? The world of mathematics so far proven and understood, or the world that is waiting to be explored? However few mathematicians there are, there is no contradiction that they carry the world of known mathematics around in their heads. The fewer there are, the less there is to carry round. Perhaps Penrose thinks they must carry the whole Platonic world around to act as a "standard", but mathematical proof doesn't work by direct inspection of Platonia, it works slowly and painfully by axioms and deductions.

"There seems to be a danger of circularity here; for to judge whether someone is in his or her right mind requires some external standard"

External to them, yes...but when we make such judgements, we ue finite and earthly resources. The idea that Platonia provides a once-and-for-all absolute standard is not of much use unless it can be explained how the standard is applied. The actual standard against which a proposed arguemnt is tested involves the community of mathematicians checking it with their flawed and finite minds. Platonia might provide a higher standard, but it is not one anyone has ever succeeded in employing.

"What I mean by this existence is really just the objectivity of mathematical truth".

And what does thatmean? Existence is existence, truth is truth. People who disbelieve in Platonism can still believe in the epistemic objectivity of mathematics.