passive_fist comments on Open thread, Dec. 21 - Dec. 27, 2015 - Less Wrong Discussion
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I tried to get a discussion going on this exact subject in my post this week, but there seemed to be little interest. A major weakness of the standard Bayesian inference method is that it assumes a problem only has two possible solutions. Many problems involve many possible solutions, and many times the number of possible solutions is unknown, and in many cases the correct solution hasn't been thought of yet. In such instances, confirmation through inductive inference may not be the best way of looking at the problem.
This is not true at all.
A large chunk of academics would say that it is. For example, from the paper I was referencing in my post:
That doesn't at all say Bayesian reasoning assumes only two possibilities. It says Bayesian reasoning assumes you know what all the possibilities are.
True, but how often do you see an explanation of Bayesian reasoning in philosophy that uses more than two possibilities?