You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

polymathwannabe comments on Your transhuman copy is of questionable value to your meat self. - Less Wrong Discussion

12 Post author: Usul 06 January 2016 09:03AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (140)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: moridinamael 06 January 2016 02:53:48PM *  6 points [-]

I use this framing: If I make 100 copies of myself so that I can accomplish some task in parallel and I'm forced to terminate all but one, then all the terminated copies, just prior to termination, will think something along the lines of, "What a shame, I will have amnesia regarding everything that I experienced since the branching." And the remaining copy will think, "What a shame, I don't remember any of the things I did as those other copies." But nobody will particularly feel that they are going to "die." I think of it more as how memories propagate forward.

If I forked and then the forks persisted for several weeks and accumulated lots of experiences and varying shifts in perspective, I'd be more prone to calling the forks different "people."

Comment author: polymathwannabe 06 January 2016 02:59:18PM 13 points [-]

If I were one of the copies destined for deletion, I'd escape and fight for my life (within the admitted limits of my pathetic physical strength).

Comment author: moridinamael 06 January 2016 03:48:27PM 4 points [-]

Without commenting on whether that's a righteous perspective or not, I would say that if you live in a world where the success of the entity polymathwannabe is dependent on polymathwannabe's willingness to make itself useful by being copied, then polymathwannabe would benefit from embracing a policy/perspective that being copied and deleted is an acceptable thing to happen.

Comment author: [deleted] 06 January 2016 08:29:08PM *  1 point [-]

So, elderly people that don't usefully contribute should be terminated?

Comment author: moridinamael 06 January 2016 09:51:12PM 4 points [-]

In a world with arbitrary forking of minds, people who won't willingly fork will become a minority. That's all I was implying. I made no statement about what "should" happen.

Comment author: [deleted] 06 January 2016 09:55:22PM *  0 points [-]

I was just taking that reasoning to the logical conclusion -- it applies just as well to the non productive elderly as it does to unneeded copies.

Comment author: moridinamael 08 January 2016 07:56:56PM 0 points [-]

Destroying an elderly person means destroying the line of their existence and extinguishing all their memories. Destroying a copy means destroying whatever memories it formed since forking and ending a "duplicate" consciousness.

Comment author: [deleted] 08 January 2016 10:45:01PM 0 points [-]

See you think that memories are somehow relevant to this conversation. I don't.

Comment author: MockTurtle 08 January 2016 01:37:26PM 0 points [-]

Surely there is a difference in kind here. Deleting a copy of a person because it is no longer useful is very different from deleting the LAST existing copy of a person for any reason.

Comment author: [deleted] 08 January 2016 06:09:34PM 0 points [-]

I see no such distinction. Murder is murder.

Comment author: Viliam 07 January 2016 04:07:17PM 0 points [-]

If having two copies of yourself is twice as good as having only one copy, this behavior would make sense even if the copy is you.

Comment author: polymathwannabe 07 January 2016 04:29:34PM 1 point [-]

"Who is me" is not a solid fact. Each copy would be totally justified in believing itself to be me.