Usul comments on Your transhuman copy is of questionable value to your meat self. - Less Wrong Discussion
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This sums up some of the problems of mind cloning nicely and readable. It also adds your specific data point that you do not care about the other selves as much as about yourself. I most liked this point about the practical consequences:
But your post falls short in not making some clear distinctions. It doesn't differentiate between copies yo do and don't interact with (the above quote vs. Omega-style simulations). It also mixes philosophical aspects with individual and practical aspects and it is not clear for me how these are meant to explain/inform each other.
Thanks for the reply. Yeah, I think I just threw a bunch of thoughts at the wall to see what would stick. I'm not really thinking too much about the practical so-I've-got-a-copy-now-what? sort of issues. I'm thinking more of the philosophical, perhaps even best categorized as Zen, implications the concept of mind-cloning has for "Who am I" in the context of changing thoughts, feelings, memories, unconscious conditioned responses, and the hard to get at thing inside which ( I first typed "observes" - bad term: too active) which is aware of these all without thinking, feeling, remembering, or responding. Because if "I" don't come along for the ride I don't think it counts as "me", which is especially important for promises of immortality.
If I'm being honest with myself, perhaps I'm doing a bit of pissing on the parades of people who think they have hope for immortality outside of meat, out of jealousy for their self-soothing convictions, however deluded I believe they are. See also "Trolling of Christians by Atheists, Motivations Behind". Cheers.
Edit: And if I'm being entirely honest with myself, I think that shying away from acknowledging that last motivation is the reason why I titled this "Your transhuman self..." and not "Your transhuman immortality...", which would sum up my argument more accurately.
I think having a firm policy for oneself in place ahead of time might circumvent a lot of these issues.
Unfortunately at this point I must reference the film Mutliplicity. In this film, a character wakes up from being duplicated and discovers to his surprise that he is the clone, not the original. He is somewhat resentful of the fact that he now has to capitulate to the desires of the original. Obviously the original didn't have a firm understanding in mind that he would have a good chance of waking up as the duplicate, nor did he have a firm policy of how he would behave if he woke up as the duplicate.
For myself, my policy might be that I would be perfectly obedient (within reason) if I woke up as a copy, but that I would insist on being terminated within a week, because I wouldn't want to go on living a life where I'm cut off from my friends and family due to the original moridinamael taking the role as the "real me".