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dxu comments on Your transhuman copy is of questionable value to your meat self. - Less Wrong Discussion

12 Post author: Usul 06 January 2016 09:03AM

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Comment author: dxu 07 January 2016 06:43:15AM -2 points [-]

Same question and they're not copies of me? Same answer.

As I'm sure you're aware, the purpose of these thought experiments is to investigate what exactly your view of consciousness entails from a decision-making perspective. The fact that you would have given the same answer even if the virtual instances weren't copies of you shows that your reason for saying "no" has nothing to do with the purpose of the question. In particular, telling me that "it's a dick move" does not help elucidate your view of consciousness and self, and thus does not advance the conversation. But since you insist, I will rephrase my question:

Would someone who shares your views on consciousness but doesn't give a crap about other people say "yes" or "no" to my deal?

Comment author: Usul 07 January 2016 07:50:08AM *  3 points [-]

Sorry if my attempt at coloring the conversation with humor upset you. That was not my intent. However, you will find it did nothing to alter the content of our discourse. You have changed your question. The question you ask now is not the question you asked previously.

Previous question: No, I do not choose to murder trillions of sentient me-copies for personal gain. I added an addendum, to provide you with further information, perhaps presuming a future question: Neither would I murder trillions of sentient not-me copies.

New question: Yes, an amoral dick who shares my views on consciousness would say yes.