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Mark_Friedenbach comments on Your transhuman copy is of questionable value to your meat self. - Less Wrong Discussion
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No, they're just different interpretations of "you". All the molecules in the teleporters are in their particular locations; the person at the destination experiences and remembers particular experiences; there is no person remaining at the sending-pad. None of these facts are in dispute. We are left with a simple "if a tree falls in the forest where no one can hear it" verbal argument. There is no further fact to make it Really True or Really False that the teleported person is still you (although there might be linguistic or social facts that make it less misleading to talk in a pattern theory or meat theory way - depending on the audience).
Try taking the inside view.
I don't know what to say. You persist on taking an outside view when that is explicitly what this debate is NOT about.
I am beginning to remember why I left less wrong. Have a nice life.
Good point: I should address the inside view. So from the inside view, I remember my past life and I conclude, for example, "things are better for me now than a year ago." But none of what I can observe from the inside view tells me whether I'm still me because of meat, or because of pattern. Further complicating matters, I can take the inside view on other people's experiences, i.e. have empathy. I can have empathy for the past, present, or future experiences of other people. If I'm looking forward to the experiences of the teleported person, is that a selfish anticipation or an empathetic one? The inside view doesn't tell me.
"But when I wake up in the destination teleporter, then I will know!" No. It's a given that "I" will wake up there, the only question is whether to use the word "I". If I look forward to a happy life after teleportation, I-before-teleporting will have been correct, regardless of pattern vs meat. The only question is whether to count that as selfish or empathetic looking-forward. And when "I" wake up, "I" still don't know whether to count "myself" a survivor or a newbie.
This - that there is no Simple Truth about whether a future experience will be mine - can be hard to believe. That's because "mine" is a very central neural category as Yudkowsky would have it. So, even when neither the inside nor outside views gives us a handle on the question, it can still seem that "will it be me?" is a factual question. But it's a verbal one.
I don't really understand the point of view of people like torekp who would say, "No, they're just different interpretations of "you"."
I don't know about you, but I'm not accustomed to being able to change my interpretation of who I am to such an extent that I can change what sensory stimuli I experience.
I can't just say to myself, "I identify with Barack Obama's identity" and expect to start experiencing the sensory stimuli that he is experiencing.
Likewise, I don't expect to be able to say to myself, "I identify with my clone" and expect to start experiencing the sensory stimuli that the clone is experiencing.
I don't seem to get a choice in the matter. If I enter the teleporter machine, I can WANT to identify with my clone that will be reconstructed on Mars all I want, but I don't expect that I will experience stepping out of the teleporter on Mars.
Personal identity is vague or ambiguous insofar as it has no clear answer in sci-fi scenarios where pattern-identity and meat-identity diverge. But that doesn't mean there is any sense in which you can be the "same person" as Barack Obama. Nor, obviously, do two unrelated bodies share experiences.
On the other hand, if you want to empathize and care deeply about Barack Obama's future experiences, you can. Nothing wrong with that.
But that has little relevance to the point at hand.
You are really just saying the problem goes away if you redefine the terms. Like how people say "I achieve immortality through my kids" or "the ancients achieved immortality through their monuments." Sure it's true... For uninteresting definitions of "immortal."
"I don't want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve immortality through not dying." -- Woody Allen
But I don't think torekp is "just saying the problem goes away if you redefine the terms". Rather, that the problem only appears when you define your terms badly or don't understand the definitions you're using. Or, perhaps, that the problem is about how you define your terms. In that situation, finding helpful redefinitions is pretty much the best you can do.
"The problem is about how you define your terms" is pretty much it. It does no good to insist that our words must have clear reference in cases utterly outside of their historical use patterns. No matter how important to you the corresponding concept may be.
I have seen no evidence of that so far. torekp's posts so far have had nothing to do with the definition of "self" used by the OP, nor has he pointed out any problem specific to that usage.