= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
Kaj_Sotala comments on AlphaGo versus Lee Sedol - Less Wrong Discussion
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (183)
How does it presume that?
Aka friendliness research. But why does that matter? If the machine has no real effectors and lots of human oversight, then why should there even be concern over friendliness? It wouldn't matter in that context. Tell a machine to do something, and it finds an evil-stupid way of doing it, and human intervention prevents any harm.
Why is it a going concern at all whether we can assure ahead of time that the actions recommended by a machine are human-friendly unless the machine is enabled to independently take those actions without human intervention? Just don't do that and it stops being a concern.
Humanity is having trouble coordinating and enforcing even global restrictions in greenhouse gasses. Try ensuring that nobody does anything risky or short-sighted with a technology that has no clearly-cut threshold between a "safe" and "dangerous" level of capability, and which can be beneficial for performing in pretty much any competitive and financially lucrative domain.
Restricting the AI's capabilities may work for a short while, assuming that only a small group of pioneers manages to develop the initial AIs and they're responsible with their use of the technology - but as Bruce Schneier says, today's top-secret programs become tomorrow's PhD theses and the next day's common applications. If we want to survive in the long term, we need to figure out how to make the free-acting AIs safe, too - otherwise it's just a ticking time bomb before the first guys accidentally or intentionally release theirs.
Humanity has done more than zero and less that optimality about things like climate change. Importantly, the situation isbelow the immanent existential threat level.
If you are going to complain that alternative proposals face coordination problems, you need to show that yours dont, or you are committing the fallacy of the dangling comparision. If people aren't going to refrain from building dangerously powerful superintellugences, assuming is possible, why would they have the sense to fit MIRIs safety features, assuming they are possible? If the law can make people fit safety features, why cant it prevent them building dangerous AIs ITFP?
I would suggest a combination of generality and agency. And what problem domain requires both?
If you allow for autonomously acting AIs, then you could have Friendly autonomous AIs tracking down and stopping Unfriendly / unauthorized AIs.
This of course depends on people developing the Friendly AIs first, but ideally it'd be enough for only the first people to get the design right, rather than depending on everyone being responsible.
It's unclear whether AI risk will become obviously imminent, either. Goertzel & Pitt 2012 argue in section 3 of their paper that this is unlikely.
Business (which by nature covers just about every domain in which you can make a profit, which is to say just about every domain relevant for human lives), warfare, military intelligence, governance... (see also my response to Mark)
You could, but if you don't have autonomously acting agents, you don't need Gort AIs. Building an agentive superintelligence that is powerful enough to take down any othe, as as MIRI conceives it, is a very risky proposition, since you need to get the value system exactly right. So its better not to be in a place where you have to do that,
The first people have to be able as well as willing to get everything right, Safety through restraint is easier and more reliable. -- you can omit a feature more reliably than you can add one.
These organizations have a need for widespread intelligence gathering , and for agentive AI, but that doesn't mean they need both in the same package. The military don't need their entire intelligence database in every drone, and don't want drones that change their mind about who the bad guys are in mid flight. Businesses don't want HFT applications that decide capitalism is a bad thing.
We want agents to act on our behalf, which means we want agents that are predictable and controllable to the required extent. Early HFT had problems which led to the addition of limits and controls. Control and predictability are close to safety. There is no drive to power that is also a drive away from safety, because uncontrolled power is of no use.
Based on the behaviour of organisations, there seems to be natural division between high-level, unpredictable decision information systems and lower level, faster acting genitive systems. In other words, they voluntarily do some of what would be required for an incremental safety programme.
I agree that it would be better not to have autonomously acting AIs, but not having any autonomously acting AIs would require a way to prevent anyone deploying them, and so far I haven't seen a proposal for that that'd seem even remotely feasible.
And if we can't stop them from being deployed, then deploying Friendly AIs first looks like the scenario that's more likely to work - which still isn't to say very likely, but at least it seems to have a chance of working even in principle. I don't see that an even-in-principle way for "just don't deploying autonomous AIs" to work.
When you say autonomous AIs, do you mean AIs that are autonomous and superinteligent?
Do you think they could he deployed by basement hackers, or only by large organisations?
Do you think an organisation like the military or business has a motivation to deploy them?
Do you agree that there are dangers to an FAI project that goes wrong?
Do you have a plan B to cope with a FAI that goes rogue?
Do you think that having a AI potentially running the world is an attractive idea to a lot of people?
AIs that are initially autonomous and non-superintelligent, then gradually develop towards superintelligence. (With the important caveat that it's unclear whether an AI needed to be generally superintelligent in order to pose a major risk for society. It's conceivable that superintelligence in some more narrow domain, like cybersecurity, would be enough - particularly in a sufficiently networked society.)
Hard to say. The way AI has developed so far, it looks like the capability might be restricted to large organizations with lots of hardware resources at first, but time will likely drive down the hardware requirements.
Yes.
Yes.
Such a plan would seem to require lots of additional information about both the specifics of the FAI plan, and also the state of the world at that time, so not really.
Depends on how we're defining "lots", but I think that the notion of a benevolent dictator has often been popular in many circles, who've also acknowledged its largest problems to be that 1) power tends to corrupt 2) even if you got a benevolent dictator, you also needed a way to ensure that all of their successors were benevolent. Both problems could be overcome with an AI, so on that basis at least I would expect lots of people to find it attractive. I'd also expect it to be considered more attractive in e.g. China, where people seem to be more skeptical towards democracy than they are in the West.
Additionally, if the AI wouldn't be the equivalent of a benevolent dictator, but rather had a more hands-off role that kept humans in power and only acted to e.g. prevent disease, violent crime, and accidents, then that could be attractive to a lot of people who preferred democracy.
If you believe in the conjunction of claims that people are motivated to create autonomous, not just agentive, AIs, and that pretty well any AI can evolve into dangerous superintelligence, then the situation is dire, because you cannot guarantee to get in first with an AI policeman as a solution to AI threat.
The situation is better, but only slightly better with legal restraint as a solution to AI threat, because you can lower the probability of disaster by banning autonomous AI...but you can only lower it, not eliminate it, because no ban is 100% effective.
And how serious are you about the threat level? Compare with micro biological research. It could be the case that someone will accidentally create an organism that spells doom for the human race, it cannot be ruled out, but no one is panicing now because there is no specific reason to rule it in, no specific pathway to it. It is a remote possibility, not a serious one.
Someone who sincerely believed that rapid self improvement towards autonomous AI could happen at any time, because there are no specific precondition or precursors for it, is someone who effectively believes it could happen now. But someone who genuinely believes an AI apocalypse could happen now is someone who would e revealing their belief in their behaviour by heading for the hills, or smashing every computer they see.
Narrow superintelligences may well be less dangerous than general superintelligences, and if you are able to restrict the generality of an AI, that could be a path to incremental safety.
But if the path to some kind of spontaneous superintelligence in an autonomous AI is also a path to spontaneous generality, that is hopeless. -- if the one can happen for no particular reason, so can the other. But is the situation really bad, or are these scenarios remote possibilities, like genetically engineered super plagues?
But by the time the hardware requirements have been driven down for entry level AI, the large organizations will already have more powerful systems, and they will dominate for better or worse. If benevolent, they will supress dangerous AIs coming out of basements, if dangerous they will suppress rivals. The only problematic scenario is where the hackers get in first, since they are less likely to partition agency from intelligence, as I have argued a large organisation would.
But the one thing we know for sure about AI is that it is hard.The scenario where a small team hits on the One Weird Trick to achieve ASI is the most worrying, but also the least likely.
Which would be what?
But building an FAI capable of policing other AIs is potentially dangerous, since it would need to be both a general intelligence and super intelligence.
For the purposes of the current argument, a democratic majority.
There are actually three problems with benevolent dictators. As well. as power corrupting, and successorship, there is the problem of ensuring or detecting benevolence in the first place.
You have conceded that Gort AI is potentially dangerous. The danger is that it is fragile in a specific way: a near miss to a benevolent value system is a dangerous one,
That also depends on both getting it right, and convincing people you have got it right
Somehow that reminds me of Sentinels from X-Men: Days of Future Past.
I think you very much misunderstand my suggestion. I'm saying that there is no reason to presume AI will be given the keys to the kingdom from day one, not advocating for some sort of regulatory regime.
So what do you see as the mechanism that will prevent anyone from handing the AI those keys, given the tremendous economic pressure towards doing exactly that?
As we discussed in Responses to AGI Risk:
I suspect that this dates back to a time when MIRI believed the answer to AI safety was to both build an agentive, maximal supeintelligence and align its values with ours, and put it in charge of all the other AIs.
The first idea has been effectively shelved, since MIRI had produced about zero lines of code,..but the idea that AI safety is value alignment continues with considerable momentum. And value alignment only makes sense if you are building an agentive AI (and have given up on corrigibility).