I would definitely agree with the "I am a person who keeps promises" and "I am a person that's loyal [...]" bits, but neither of those feel the same as "I am a democrat" or even "I am a seeker of accurate world models [...]" type sentences. They're still not identities for me.
"Identities" tend to get treated as things that "have to" be true. A strong identity democrat might be insulted and defensive if you suggest that their stance on some issue is too conservative. Likewise a strong identity "rationalist" might get defensive and cook up some rationalizations if you suggest that they're biased against a certain view and not accurately seeking truth.
It's the "has to be true" part that causes problems. Am I someone that seeks accurate models, whatever they turn out to be? For the most part, yeah. Inaccurate models, especially without accurate metamodels that warn you not to use them, are pretty problematic and it really takes a twisted circumstance to make it worthwhile. But this isn't a fact about my identity, it's a fact about the world that accurate models get me more of what I want so that I generally want accurate models (and I'm willing to sacrifice a lot of "fit in without hiding beliefs" and the like in order to get them).
"I am a person who keeps promises" is likewise just a matter of fact. I am. Not being so would mean people have no reason to trust me and that would be very bad for me - so I make sure I don't give people not to trust me. It's still allowed to be untrue and I'm always allowed to consider breaking promises. It's just that doing so would be dumb, so I don't. Even when I could get away with it, since that weakens the story and my ability to credibly signal that it's true and I probably wouldn't be able to pull off the "forgot my lunch money" version of parfit's hitchhiker anymore.
In short, I have no problems having beliefs about what kind of person I am, but without exceptions I don't want motivations to believe - even when I have motivations to make it true.
It's easier to seek true beliefs if you keep your (epistemic) identity small. (E.g., if you avoid beliefs like "I am a democrat", and say only "I am a seeker of accurate world-models, whatever those turn out to be".)
It seems analogously easier to seek effective internal architectures if you also keep non-epistemic parts of your identity small -- not "I am a person who enjoys nature", nor "I am someone who values mathematics" nor "I am a person who aims to become good at email" but only "I am a person who aims to be effective, whatever that turns out to entail (and who is willing to let much of my identity burn in the process)".
There are obviously hazards as well as upsides that come with this; still, the upsides seem worth putting out there.
The two biggest exceptions I would personally make, which seem to mitigate the downsides: "I am a person who keeps promises" and "I am a person who is loyal to [small set of people] and who can be relied upon to cooperate more broadly -- whatever that turns out to entail".
Thoughts welcome.