I will take minor exception to your exceptions. One of the big lessons of LessWrong for me is how different decision processes react in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. In your exceptions, you don't condition your behaviour on the expected behaviour of your trading partner. The greatest lesson I took away from LessWrong was Don't Be CooperateBot. I would however, endorse FairBot versions of your statements:
"I am the kind of person who keeps promises to the kind of person who keeps promises," and "I am a person who can be relied upon to cooperate with people who can be relied upon to cooperate."
(You'll notice that I cut out the loyalty part on that second one. I am undecided here. A lot of social technology at least vaguely pattern matches to CliqueBot, which is how I generally map loyalty to the prisoner's dilemma. However, I'm not going to endorse it as optimal.)
It's easier to seek true beliefs if you keep your (epistemic) identity small. (E.g., if you avoid beliefs like "I am a democrat", and say only "I am a seeker of accurate world-models, whatever those turn out to be".)
It seems analogously easier to seek effective internal architectures if you also keep non-epistemic parts of your identity small -- not "I am a person who enjoys nature", nor "I am someone who values mathematics" nor "I am a person who aims to become good at email" but only "I am a person who aims to be effective, whatever that turns out to entail (and who is willing to let much of my identity burn in the process)".
There are obviously hazards as well as upsides that come with this; still, the upsides seem worth putting out there.
The two biggest exceptions I would personally make, which seem to mitigate the downsides: "I am a person who keeps promises" and "I am a person who is loyal to [small set of people] and who can be relied upon to cooperate more broadly -- whatever that turns out to entail".
Thoughts welcome.