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ShardPhoenix comments on The AI in Mary's room - Less Wrong Discussion

4 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 24 May 2016 01:19PM

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Comment author: ShardPhoenix 29 May 2016 11:15:02AM *  0 points [-]

A way to rephrase the question is, "is there any sequence of sensory inputs other than the stimulation of red cones by red light that will cause Mary to have comparable memories re: the color red as someone who has had their red cones stimulated at some point". It's possible that the answer is no, which says something interesting about the API of the human machine, but doesn't seem necessarily fundamental to the concept of knowledge.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 29 May 2016 12:50:43PM *  -2 points [-]

The relevance is physicalism.

If physicalism is the claim that everything, has a physical explanation, then the inability to understand what pain is without being in pain is a contradiction to it. I don' think anyone here believes that physicalism is an unmportamt issue.

Comment author: ShardPhoenix 29 May 2016 01:36:54PM 0 points [-]

I'm arguing that there's no contradiction and that this inability is just a limit of humans/organic brains, not a fundamental fact about pain or information.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 29 May 2016 03:12:51PM *  0 points [-]

If you want to argue to that conclusion, then arge for it: What kind of limit? Where does it come from?