The latter. The former is purely experiential knowledge, and as I have repeatedly said is contained in a superset of verbal (what you call 'objectiive) knowledge, but is disjoint with the set of verbal ('objective') knowledge itself. This is my box metaphor.

You have said that according to you, stipulatively, subjective knowledge is a subset of objective knowledge. What we mean by objective knowledge is generally knowledge that can be understood at second hand, without being in a special state or having had particular experiences. You say that the subjective subset of objective knowledge is somehow opaque, so that it does not have the properties usually associated with objective knowledge..but why should anyone believe it is objective, when it lacks the usual properties, and is only asserted to be objective?

redness of red is still physical

I can't see how that has been proven. You can't prove that redness is physically encoded in the relevant sense just by noting that physical changes occur in brains, because

1 There's no physical proof of physicalism

2 An assumption of physicalism is question begging

3 You need an absence of non physical proeties, states and processes, not just the presence of physical changes

4 Physicalism as a meaningful claim, and not just a stipulative label needs to pay its way in explanation...but its ability to explain subjective knowledge is just at is in question.

What does this knowledge do? How do we tell the difference between someone with and without these 'subjective experiences'? What definition of knowledge admits it as valid

Its hard to prove the existence of subjective knowledge in an objective basis. What else would you expect.? There is a widespread belief in subjective, experiential knowledge and the evidence for it is subjective. The alternative is the sort of thing caricatured as 'how was it for me, darling'.