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entirelyuseless comments on Iterated Gambles and Expected Utility Theory - Less Wrong Discussion

1 Post author: Sable 25 May 2016 09:29PM

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Comment author: HungryHobo 26 May 2016 12:41:07PM 0 points [-]

Yep, for me 100 dollars provides a nice chunk of utility. 10000 does not provide 100 times as much utility and anything more than a couple hundred K provides little utility at all.

In theory that 1.6 billion powerball lottery had a (barely) positive expected return (depending on how taxes work out) and thus rationalists should throw money at it but in reality a certainty of 1 dollar is better than a 1 in a billion chance of getting 1.6 billion. (I know these numbers aren't exact)

Comment author: entirelyuseless 26 May 2016 01:32:49PM 0 points [-]

I don't think this works out, if you think you are agreeing with Villiam. Suppose your net worth is $20,000. Then the utility increase represented by $100 is going to be [proportional to] 0.00498. On the other hand, the utility increase represented by $10,000 is going to be [proportional to] 0.40546. That is, $10,000 will be 81 times as valuable as $100.

In other words, it is less than 100 times as valuable. But not by that much, and certainly not by enough to explain the degree to which people prefer the certain $100.

Comment author: HungryHobo 26 May 2016 02:38:33PM 0 points [-]

Using your net worth as part of the calculation doesn't feel right.

Even if my net worth is quite high much of that may be inaccessible to me short term.

If I have 100,000 in liquid cash then 100 has lower utility to me than if I have 100,000 in something non liquid like a house and no cash.