= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
Riothamus comments on Zombies Redacted - Less Wrong Discussion
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (165)
I know people who claim that they don't have qualia. I doubt that it is true, but based on their words they should be considered zombies. ))
I would like to suggest zombies of second kind. This is a person with inverted spectrum. It even could be my copy, which speaks all the same philosophical nonsense as me, but any time I see green, he sees red, but names it green. Is he possible? I could imagine such atom-exact copy of me, but with inverted spectrum. And if such second type zombies are possible, it is argument for epiphenomenalism. Now I will explain why.
Phenomenological judgments (PJ) about own consciousness, that is the ability to say something about your own consciousness, will be the same in me and my zombie of the second type.
But there are two types of PJ: quantitative (like "I have consciousness") and qualitative which describes exactly what type of qualia I experience now.
The qualitative type of PJ is impossible. I can't transfer my knowing about "green" in the words.
It means that the fact of existence of phenomenological judgments doesn't help in case of second type zombies.
So, after some upgrade, zombie argument still works as an argument for epiphenomenalism.
I would also recommend the following article with introduce "PJ" term and many problems about it (but I do not agree with it completely) "Experimental Methods for Unraveling the Mind-body Problem: The Phenomenal Judgment Approach" Victor Argonov http://philpapers.org/rec/ARGMAA-2
I do not think we need to go as far as i-zombies. We can take two people, show them the same object under arbitrarily close conditions, and get the answer of 'green' out of both of them while one does not experience green on account of being color-blind.
What do you infer from being able to do this?
(Surely not that qualia are nonphysical, which is the moral Chalmers draws from thinking about p-zombies; colour-blindness involves identifiable physical differences.)
This gives us these options under the Chalmers scheme:
Same input -> same output & same qualia
Same input -> same output & different qualia
Same input -> same output & no qualia
I infer the ineffable green-ness of green is not even wrong. We have no grounds for thinking there is such a thing.