There are several well-known games in which the pareto optima and Nash equilibria are disjoint sets.
The most famous is probably the prisoner's dilemma. Races to the bottom or tragedies of the commons typically have this feature as well.
I proposed calling these inefficient games. More generally, games where the sets of pareto optima and Nash equilibria are distinct (but not disjoint), such as a stag hunt could be called potentially inefficient games.
It seems worthwhile to study (potentially) inefficient games as a class and see what can be discovered about them, but I don't know of any such work (pointers welcome!)
In this case, we should really define "coercion". Could you please elaborate what you meant through that word?
One could argue, that if someone holds a gun to your head and demands your money, it's not coercion, just a game, where the expected payoff of not giving the money is smaller than the expected payoff of handing it over.
(Of course, I completely agree with your explanation about taxes. It's just the usage of "coercion" in the rest of your comment which seems a little odd)
I originally used 'fiat' instead of 'coercion'. I was just trying to make sure we don't miss other possibilities besides regulations for solving problems like these.