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Val comments on Inefficient Games - Less Wrong Discussion

14 Post author: capybaralet 23 August 2016 05:47PM

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Comment author: Gram_Stone 23 August 2016 07:15:56PM *  13 points [-]

It's nice to see that someone else has thought about this.

It's a popular rationalist pastime to try coming up with munchkin solutions to social dilemmas. A friend posed one such munchkin solution to me, and I thought he had an unrealistic idea of why regulations work, so I said to him:

Even though it's what you really want, I don't think the fact that you know everyone else will cooperate is the interesting thing per se about regulations, but that this is a consequence of the fact that you have decreased what was once the temptation payoff and thus constructed a different game. You have functionally reduced the expected payoff of the option "Don't pay taxes," by law. If you don't pay taxes, then you get fined or jailed. Now all players are playing a game where the Nash equilibrium is also Pareto optimal: Pay taxes or be fined or jailed. Clearly, one should pay taxes.

Now, ironically, this is good news if we want to cause better outcomes with less or no coercion, because it suggests that it is not coercion in itself that does the good work, but the fact that we have changed the payoffs to construct a different game; we can interpret coercion as just one instantiation of the general process by which 'inefficient games' become 'efficient games'. Coercion is perhaps a simple way to do the thing that all possible solutions to this problem seem to have in common, but there may be others that we can assume to syntactically change the payoffs in the way that coercion does, but which we may semantically interpret as something other than coercion.

A different time, a friend noticed that people building up trust seemed qualitatively similar to a Prisoner's Dilemma but couldn't see exactly how. I was like, "Have you heard of Stag Hunt? That's the whole reason Rousseau came up with it!" PD is just one kind of coordination game.

More generally, isn't it weird that the central objects of study in game theory, despite all of the formalization that has taken place since the beginning of the field, are remembered in the form of anecdotes?! You learn about the Stag Hunt and the Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken and all other sorts of game, but there doesn't really seem to be any systematic notion of how different games are connected, or if any games are 'closer' to others in some sense (as our intuitions might suggest).

Meditations on Moloch was pretty but in the audience I coughed the words 'mechanism design'. It just seems like pointing out the mainstream academic work makes you boring when you're commenting on something poetic. You also might like Robinson and Goforth's Topology of the 2x2 Games. The math isn't that complex and it provides more insight than a barrage of anecdotes. Note that to my knowledge this is not taught in traditional game theory courses but probably should be one day. They refer to this general class of games as the 'social dilemmas', if I recall correctly.

Comment author: Val 24 August 2016 02:39:16PM 1 point [-]

In this case, we should really define "coercion". Could you please elaborate what you meant through that word?

One could argue, that if someone holds a gun to your head and demands your money, it's not coercion, just a game, where the expected payoff of not giving the money is smaller than the expected payoff of handing it over.

(Of course, I completely agree with your explanation about taxes. It's just the usage of "coercion" in the rest of your comment which seems a little odd)

Comment author: g_pepper 24 August 2016 03:22:38PM *  3 points [-]

I do not think that Gram_Stone is making the claim that fining or jailing those who do not pay their taxes is not coercion. Instead, I think that he is arguing that it is not the coercion per se that results in most people paying their taxes, but rather that (due to the coercion) failing to pay taxes does not have a favorable payoff, and that it is the unfavorable payoff that causes most people to pay their taxes. So, if there were some way to create favorable payoffs for desirable behavior without coercion, then this would work just as well as does using coercion.

Gram_Stone, please correct me if that is not accurate. Also, do you have any ideas as to how to make voluntary payment of taxes have a favorable payoff without using coercion?

Comment author: Gram_Stone 24 August 2016 04:50:36PM 0 points [-]

That sounds accurate to me.

I can't think of anything off of the top of my head. I was really just trying to point out the general dynamic.

Comment author: Gram_Stone 24 August 2016 04:52:49PM 1 point [-]

I originally used 'fiat' instead of 'coercion'. I was just trying to make sure we don't miss other possibilities besides regulations for solving problems like these.