I do not think that Gram_Stone is making the claim that fining or jailing those who do not pay their taxes is not coercion. Instead, I think that he is arguing that it is not the coercion per se that results in most people paying their taxes, but rather that (due to the coercion) failing to pay taxes does not have a favorable payoff, and that it is the unfavorable payoff that causes most people to pay their taxes. So, if there were some way to create favorable payoffs for desirable behavior without coercion, then this would work just as well as does using coercion.
Gram_Stone, please correct me if that is not accurate. Also, do you have any ideas as to how to make voluntary payment of taxes have a favorable payoff without using coercion?
That sounds accurate to me.
I can't think of anything off of the top of my head. I was really just trying to point out the general dynamic.
There are several well-known games in which the pareto optima and Nash equilibria are disjoint sets.
The most famous is probably the prisoner's dilemma. Races to the bottom or tragedies of the commons typically have this feature as well.
I proposed calling these inefficient games. More generally, games where the sets of pareto optima and Nash equilibria are distinct (but not disjoint), such as a stag hunt could be called potentially inefficient games.
It seems worthwhile to study (potentially) inefficient games as a class and see what can be discovered about them, but I don't know of any such work (pointers welcome!)