Well, yes, but your example is a sub-type of my "more profitable" claim. The companies want the definitions to be clear because otherwise there is a large uncertainty cost which will affect profits. They don't care about destroying value as long as it's not their value.
I agree that companies often lobby for regulations which decrease their risk -- but typically what they want is to ossify the existing structures and put up barriers to newcomers and outside innovation. If you are large and powerful enough to influence regulations, you want to preserve your position as large and powerful. Generally speaking, that's not a good thing.
There are several well-known games in which the pareto optima and Nash equilibria are disjoint sets.
The most famous is probably the prisoner's dilemma. Races to the bottom or tragedies of the commons typically have this feature as well.
I proposed calling these inefficient games. More generally, games where the sets of pareto optima and Nash equilibria are distinct (but not disjoint), such as a stag hunt could be called potentially inefficient games.
It seems worthwhile to study (potentially) inefficient games as a class and see what can be discovered about them, but I don't know of any such work (pointers welcome!)