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Comment author:hairyfigment
11 October 2016 02:40:59AM
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Eliezer and E.T. Jaynes strongly urge seeing probabilities as subjective degrees of certainty that follow fixed laws (an extension of logic). If QBism is supposed to be compatible with this view - and yet not a form of MWI - then where do the complex numbers come from? Do they represent the map or the territory?
Comment author:MrMind
14 October 2016 09:13:26AM
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That's the basic, some say the only, mystery of MWI: why the world operates according to subjective probability?
You'll find this question posed in the Sequence in some places.
No, that is not the question I asked. The question I asked was what the god-damned imaginary numbers mean, if they aren't describing reality. Because they don't look like subjective probability.
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Comments (32)
Q: Quantum. Bayesianism isn't the LessWrong official preferred interpretation of QM because....?
Eliezer and E.T. Jaynes strongly urge seeing probabilities as subjective degrees of certainty that follow fixed laws (an extension of logic). If QBism is supposed to be compatible with this view - and yet not a form of MWI - then where do the complex numbers come from? Do they represent the map or the territory?
That's the basic, some say the only, mystery of MWI: why the world operates according to subjective probability?
You'll find this question posed in the Sequence in some places.
No, that is not the question I asked. The question I asked was what the god-damned imaginary numbers mean, if they aren't describing reality. Because they don't look like subjective probability.
The existence of some form of subjective probability is perfectly compatible with the existence of some other form of objective probability.