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Comment author:Bound_up
12 October 2016 10:18:19PM
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Mmm, that's not quite the right abstraction. You're probably against innocents going to jail in general, no?
Whereas some Roman might not care, as long as it's no one they care about.
All I'm getting at is that the Romans didn't think certain things were wrong, but if they were shown in a sufficiently deep way everything we know, they would be moved by it, whereas if we were shown everything they know, we would not find it persuasive of their position. Neither would they, after they had seen what we've seen.
I'm talking metaethics, what makes something moral, what it means for something to be moral. Failed ones include divine command theory, the "whatever contributes to human flourishing" idea, whatever makes people happy, whatever matches some platonic ideals out there somehow, whatever leads to selfish interest, etc.
Comment author:Lumifer
13 October 2016 02:24:26PM
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if they were shown in a sufficiently deep way everything we know, they would be moved by it
That doesn't seem obvious to me at all.
Let's try it on gay marriage. Romans certainly knew and practiced homosexuality, same for marriage. What knowledge exactly do you want to convey to them to persuade them that gay marriage is a good thing?
I'm talking metaethics, what makes something moral
So, prescriptive. I am not sure in which way do you consider the theories "failed" -- in the sense that they have not risen to the status of physics meaning being able to empirically prove all their claims? That doesn't look to be a viable criterion. In the sense of not having taken over the world? I don't know, the divine command theory is (or, at least, has been) pretty good at that. You probably wouldn't want a single theory to take over the world, anyway.
Comments (47)
Mmm, that's not quite the right abstraction. You're probably against innocents going to jail in general, no?
Whereas some Roman might not care, as long as it's no one they care about.
All I'm getting at is that the Romans didn't think certain things were wrong, but if they were shown in a sufficiently deep way everything we know, they would be moved by it, whereas if we were shown everything they know, we would not find it persuasive of their position. Neither would they, after they had seen what we've seen.
I'm talking metaethics, what makes something moral, what it means for something to be moral. Failed ones include divine command theory, the "whatever contributes to human flourishing" idea, whatever makes people happy, whatever matches some platonic ideals out there somehow, whatever leads to selfish interest, etc.
That doesn't seem obvious to me at all.
Let's try it on gay marriage. Romans certainly knew and practiced homosexuality, same for marriage. What knowledge exactly do you want to convey to them to persuade them that gay marriage is a good thing?
So, prescriptive. I am not sure in which way do you consider the theories "failed" -- in the sense that they have not risen to the status of physics meaning being able to empirically prove all their claims? That doesn't look to be a viable criterion. In the sense of not having taken over the world? I don't know, the divine command theory is (or, at least, has been) pretty good at that. You probably wouldn't want a single theory to take over the world, anyway.