If his goal is to actually convince EA organizations to change their behavior, then it could be argued that his rhetorical tactics are in fact likely to be the most effective way of actually achieving that. We should not underestimate the effectiveness of strategies that work by negative PR or by using rhetorical as opposed to strictly argumentative language. I would argue they actually have a pretty good track record of getting organizations to change, without completely destroying the organization (or an associated movement). Uber and United have probably just gone through some of the worst negative coverage it is possible to undergo, and yet the probability that either of them will be completely destroyed by that is almost negligible. On the other hand, the probability that they will improve due to the negative controversy is quite high by my estimation.
Noting the history of organizations that have been completely wiped out by scandal or controversy, it is usually the case that they failed to accomplish their primary goal (such as maximizing shareholder value), and typically in a catastrophic or permanent way that indicated almost beyond doubt that they would never be able to accomplish that goal. It is generally not enough that their leaders acted immorally or unethically (since they can usually be replaced), or that they fail at a subgoal (because subgoals tend to be easier to modify). And since EA is not a single organization, but is better understood as a movement, it is unlikely that the entire movement will be crippled by even a major controversy in one of its organizations. It's really hard to destroy philosophies.
OpenPhil leadership stated that responding to criticisms and being transparent about their decision-making is a highly costly action to take. And I think it has been well-argued at this point (and not in a purely rhetorical way) that EA organizations are so strongly motivated against taking these actions (as judged by observation of their actions), that they may even occasionally act in the opposite direction. Therefore, if there exist convincing arguments that they are engaging in undesirable behavior, and given that we fairly well know that they are acting on strong incentives, then it follows that in order to change their behavior, they need to be strongly motivated in the other direction. It is not, in general, possible to modify an agent's utility function by reasoning alone. All rational agents are instrumentally motivated to preserve their preferences and resist attempts at modification.
My argument is not that we need to resort to sensationalist tactics, but only that purely argumentative strategies that offer no negative cost to the organization in question are unlikely to be effective either. And additionally that actions that add this cost are unlikely to be so costly that they result in permanent or unrecoverable damage.
I agree that this is a big and complicated deal and "never resort to sensationalist tactics" isn't a sufficient answer for reasons close to what you describe. I'm not sure what the answer is, but I've been thinking about ideas.
Basically, I think were automatically fail if we have no way to punish defectors, and we also automatically fail controversy/sensationalism-as-normally-practiced is our main tool of doing so.
I think the threat of sensationalist tactics needs to be real. But it needs to be more like Nuclear Deterrence than it is like tit-for...
It’s common to think that someone else is arguing in bad faith. In a recent blog post, Nate Soares claims that this intuition is both wrong and harmful:
It would be surprising, if bad intent were so rare in the relevant sense, that people would be so quick to jump to the conclusion that it is present. Why would that be adaptive?
What reason do we have to believe that we’re systematically overestimating this? If we’re systematically overestimating it, why should we believe that it’s adaptive to suppress this?
There are plenty of reasons why we might make systematic errors on things that are too infrequent or too inconsequential to yield a lot of relevant-feeling training data or matter much for reproductive fitness, but social intuitions are a central case of the sort of things I would expect humans to get right by default. I think the burden of evidence is on the side disagreeing with the intuitions behind this extremely common defensive response, to explain what bad actors are, why we are on such a hair-trigger against them, and why we should relax this.
Nate continues:
Nate's argument is almost entirely about mens rea - about subjective intent to make something bad happen. But mens rea is not really a thing. He contrasts this with actions that have bad consequences, which are common. But there’s something in the middle: following an incentive gradient that rewards distortions. For instance, if you rigorously A/B test your marketing until it generates the presentation that attracts the most customers, and don’t bother to inspect why they respond positively to the result, then you’re simply saying whatever words get you the most customers, regardless of whether they’re true. In such cases, whether or not you ever formed a conscious intent to mislead, your strategy is to tell whichever lie is most convenient; there was nothing in your optimization target that forced your words to be true ones, and most possible claims are false, so you ended up making false claims.
More generally, if you try to control others’ actions, and don’t limit yourself to doing that by honestly informing them, then you’ll end up with a strategy that distorts the truth, whether or not you meant to. The default state for any given constraint is that it has not been applied to someone's behavior. To say that someone has the honest intent to inform is a positive claim about their intent. It's clear to me that we should expect this to sometimes be the case - sometimes people perceive a convergent incentive to inform one another, rather than a divergent incentive to grab control. But, if you do not defend yourself and your community against divergent strategies unless there is unambiguous evidence, then you make yourself vulnerable to those strategies, and should expect to get more of them.The default hypothesis should be that any given constraint has not been applied to someone's behavior. To say that someone has the honest intent to inform is a positive claim about their intent. It's clear to me that we should expect this to sometimes be the case - sometimes people have a convergent incentive to inform one another, rather than a divergent incentive to grab control.
I’ve been criticizing EA organizations a lot for deceptive or otherwise distortionary practices (see here and here), and one response I often get is, in effect, “How can you say that? After all, I've personally assured you that my organization never had a secret meeting in which we overtly resolved to lie to people!”
Aside from the obvious problems with assuring someone that you're telling the truth, this is generally something of a nonsequitur. Your public communication strategy can be publicly observed. If it tends to create distortions, then I can reasonable infer that you’re following some sort of incentive gradient that rewards some kinds of distortions. I don’t need to know about your subjective experiences to draw this conclusion. I don’t need to know your inner narrative. I can just look, as a member of the public, and report what I see.
Acting in bad faith doesn’t make you intrinsically a bad person, because there’s no such thing. And besides, it wouldn't be so common if it required an exceptionally bad character. But it has to be OK to point out when people are not just mistaken, but following patterns of behavior that are systematically distorting the discourse - and to point this out publicly so that we can learn to do better, together.
(Cross-posted at my personal blog.)
[EDITED 1 May 2017 - changed wording of title from "behavior" to "disposition"]