It's where you are willing to look, as opposed to where you are not.
That's hardly a definition. I think it's you who is begging the question here.
You keep insisting that cosnciousness can only be found in the behaviour of someone else
I have no idea where you got that. I explicitly state "I say you must have both", just a couple of posts above.
The state of being aware, or perceiving physical facts or mental concepts; a state of general wakefulness and responsiveness to environment; a functioning sensorium.
Here's a google result for "medical definition of consciousness". It is quite close to "brain activity", dreaming aside. If you extended the definition to non-human agents, any dumb robot would qualify. Did you have some other definition in mind?
I explicitly state "I say you must have both", just a couple of posts above
Behaviour alone versus behaviour plus brain scans doesn't make a relevant difference.. Brain scans are still objective data about someone else. It'sll an attempt to deal with subjectivity on an objective basis.
The medical definition of consciousness is not brain activity because there is some dirt if brain activity during, sleep states and even coma. The brain is not a PC.
(This post grew out of an old conversation with Wei Dai.)
Imagine a person sitting in a room, communicating with the outside world through a terminal. Further imagine that the person knows some secret fact (e.g. that the Moon landings were a hoax), but is absolutely committed to never revealing their knowledge of it in any way.
Can you, by observing the input-output behavior of the system, distinguish it from a person who doesn't know the secret, or knows some other secret instead?
Clearly the only reasonable answer is "no, not in general".
Now imagine a person in the same situation, claiming to possess some mental skill that's hard for you to verify (e.g. visualizing four-dimensional objects in their mind's eye). Can you, by observing the input-output behavior, distinguish it from someone who is lying about having the skill, but has a good grasp of four-dimensional math otherwise?
Again, clearly, the only reasonable answer is "not in general".
Now imagine a sealed box that behaves exactly like a human, dutifully saying things like "I'm conscious", "I experience red" and so on. Moreover, you know from trustworthy sources that the box was built by scanning a human brain, and then optimizing the resulting program to use less CPU and memory (preserving the same input-output behavior). Would you be willing to trust that the box is in fact conscious, and has the same internal experiences as the human brain it was created from?
A philosopher believing in computationalism would emphatically say yes. But considering the examples above, I would say I'm not sure! Not at all!