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turchin comments on In praise of fake frameworks - Less Wrong Discussion

14 Post author: Valentine 11 July 2017 02:12AM

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Comment author: turchin 13 July 2017 12:35:08PM 0 points [-]

Maybe try Bayesian approach - where you have several ontologies with different probability weights? In that case, you could work with each ontology as if it is real, but take its predictions with high discount, and also use the predictions to update relative weights of the ontologies.

Comment author: ChristianKl 15 July 2017 01:49:33PM 2 points [-]

Different ontologies are useful in different contexts. If you model airplanes with Newton's laws you don't get a benefit by applying some probability to them and another probability to the formula of general relativity.

Comment author: turchin 15 July 2017 01:58:24PM 0 points [-]

Surely if you know which ontologies are true and in which context you currently are.

For example, one could give 50 per cent to the probability that he lives in the real world and 50 per cent that he lives in a computer simulation.

Comment author: ChristianKl 15 July 2017 02:34:22PM 1 point [-]

I'm not sure what you mean with "which ontologies are true". If you take the example of Valentine's ki, that ontology allowed Valentine for a long time to do things that he couldn't do without the ontology. Putting probabilities on ki being the true ontology misses the point.

Comment author: turchin 15 July 2017 03:35:17PM 0 points [-]

If he assigned 50 per cent probability to the ki ontology, he still could do everything which is required by ki-ontology, but a) divide expected gains on 2 b) updated probability of the ki ontology depending if it works or not, and also based on explanation power of other ontologies for the same set of the evidence.